

UNITED STATES ARMY
COMBAT FORCES
Journal

MAY 1954
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Thus, as you can see, the Association does have a need for a seal that can do several jobs. To get one, the Executive Council has voted to award \$100 to the person who submits a design that is selected as the best by a panel of judges to be appointed by the Council. Deadline for entries is 30 September 1954.

So here's your chance to make your doodling or your hobby pay off. Everyone, except members of the Council of the Association and their families, employees of the Association and their families, and the judges and

their families, is eligible. The Association doesn't care whether you are a private or a general, a marine or a Red Cross hostess, a housewife or a junior high school student, a professional artist, designer, or practicing doodler. All the Association wants is a design that will make an effective seal for the Association.

For those who are not too familiar with what the Association is and does, read the left-hand column of page 4 of this issue. Remember, the Association is for all branches and all components of the Army. It is American. It is not a government instrumentality. It stresses the fighting man, but welcomes all who believe in national defense. It is proud of the history of the American soldier, from the snow at Valley Forge to the ice at the Chosin reservoir. It recognizes the A-bomb, the H-bomb, the guided missile . . . and beyond. It believes that man is the soul and fiber of the Army, and remains so despite technological development.

Read the rules that appear below, and go to work. May the hundred iron men be yours!

Contest Rules

1. This contest is open to any citizen of the United States, and any member of the Association of the United States Army not a citizen of an Iron Curtain country. Members of the Executive Council of the Association of the United States Army, employees of the Association, and members of their immediate families and of the families of the judges are not eligible to compete.

2. An award of \$100 will be given to the person submitting the design that the judges select as the best of those entered. The design should be suitable for use both as a medal that can be awarded to individuals by the Association, and as the seal of the Association of the United States Army.

3. You may submit as many designs as you desire but each design must be submitted on a separate sheet.

4. All submissions become the property of the Association of the United States Army.

5. The Association is not committed to the use of the award-winning design, but the award will be presented whether or not the design is used.

6. Each design considered for the award will be checked by a heraldry expert, but the entry need not have any heraldic significance. If the design has in-

tended heraldic significance, a descriptive statement must accompany the design.

7. Your submission need not be a finished work of art if all details are clear and if it can be copied by a professional artist.

8. The decision of the judges will be final.

9. There will be three judges: one from the graphic arts field, one from the heraldic field, and one with thirty or more years of active military service.

10. Entries arriving after 30 September 1954 will not be considered. All entries should be addressed to:

**The Secretary, Association of the United States Army
1529 Eighteenth St. N.W., Washington 6, D. C.**

11. No names or other identification shall appear on any design. Place your name and address on a separate sheet attached securely to each entry. The Secretary of the Association will assign an identifying number to each entry and remove the sheet showing name and address before submitting the design to the judges.

12. The name of the award-winning contestant will be published in the COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL. Upon recommendation of the judges, names of contestants whose designs are of outstanding merit may also be published.



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UNITED STATES ARMY COMBAT FORCES *Journal*

Vol. 4, No. 10

May 1954

United States Army Combat Forces Journal is published monthly by the Association of the United States Army. Publication date: 25th of preceding month. Publication, Editorial and Executive Offices: 1529 Eighteenth Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C. Copyright, 1954, by Association of the United States Army. Entered as Second Class Matter at Washington, D. C., additional entry at Richmond, Va., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Articles appearing in *Combat Forces Journal* do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Department of the Army, the officers and members of the Executive Council of the Association of the U. S. Army, or the editors.

Association's Journal

WHAT goes on at a meeting of the Executive Council of your Association? Here is a report of some highlights of the meeting of 22 March.

The Secretary's report received a thorough going-over. The Council members asked many penetrating questions about the business side of the Association's activities.

The Secretary of the Association was directed to prepare a one-time report on inventories and purchases, and was given authority to devalue obsolete and obsolescent books on hand.

The next item was a discussion of editorial policy; the President appointed a committee to study this problem, and directed the committee to report at the June meeting.

The Council authorized a contest to select a seal for the Association (see the inside cover for details).

The question of an annual meeting at an Army post or installation brought forth some enthusiastic discussion. The Assistant Secretary was directed to prepare a plan for such a meeting.

THE President appointed a new Nominating Committee; in naming the committee he expressed his feeling that more Council members should be chosen from the ranks below lieutenant colonel, pointing to the valuable services of Major Kenworthy, Major (then Captain) Boatner, Captain Glasgow, and Captain Bolton.

The officers and members of the Executive Council of your Association take their duties seriously; they devote much time and effort to improving the JOURNAL and to assisting the staff in keeping the organization on a sound financial basis.

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One year \$5.00; two years \$9.00 when paid in advance; three years \$12.00 when paid in advance. Subscriptions for libraries, civilian groups or activities, and others not eligible for membership in the Association of the U. S. Army \$5.00 per year. Foreign subscriptions \$6.00 payable in advance. For other rates write Circulation Manager, Combat Forces Journal, 1529 18th Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

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COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

Words to Help You Serve

MANY reasons have been given for the very definite reluctance of many young men to pursue planned military careers. The decline of service morale was brought on in large part by attacks on the military profession and economic discrimination. All these must be rectified before the services can compete on even terms with other professions for the best American youth. There is also the idea that the profession of arms is out-moded. This we don't believe. Opportunity still exists.

It occurred to us that men who have devoted most of their lives to the Army, who had retired after successful military careers, and then went on to important second careers in industry, should be able to make dispassionate judgments that young men would heed. So we asked a few retired officers to speak their minds. Two of their replies are reproduced below.

It was entirely unplanned, but we are struck with the similarity between the statements. Both General Devers and General Clay have balanced the appeal of idealism with the hard facts of personal development and security. Both point out that the size of the pay-check is not the most important consideration, and both say they believe that opportunities are greater now than they were when they entered the Army.



Stimulating and Satisfying Life

General Jacob L. Devers

PERHAPS ten years from now—and certainly forty years from now—you will look back to this period either with regret or with satisfaction, for the decisions you make now will determine the pattern of the remainder of your life.

Three primary factors are involved—your own tastes, aptitudes,

(Continued on page 47)



Opportunities and Responsibilities

General Lucius D. Clay

I HAVE been distressed for some time over the reports which have reached me about the difficulties the Army is experiencing in attracting qualified young men to accept commissions with a view to making the Army a career.

I suppose some of this comes from the apparent lessening in the

(Continued on page 47)

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
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ASSOCIATION OF THE U. S. ARMY

U. S. Infantry Association, 1893-1950

U. S. Field Artillery Association, 1910-1950

PURPOSES

The Association of the United States Army shall be an organization wherein all who are in accord with its objectives may join in the exchange of ideas and information on military matters, and in fostering, supporting, and advocating the legitimate and proper role of the Army of the United States and of all its elements, branches, and components in providing for and assuring the Nation's military security.

OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the Association shall be to encourage and foster for all elements, branches, and components of the Army of the United States, and for such veterans' and unit organizations as may be appropriate:

The dissemination of information relating to history, activities, problems and plans.

The exchange of ideas on and discussion of military matters.

The perpetuation of those Army and unit traditions that contribute to esprit de corps and superior performance of duty.

The cultivation of cordial relations among the several armed services and with the public.

The promotion, attainment, and preservation of high professional standards.

INSTRUMENTALITIES

The primary instrumentality for the carrying out of the purposes and the attainment of the objectives of the Association shall be the publication of its magazine, COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL. The secondary instrumentalities of the Association for the carrying out of its purposes and the attainment of its objectives shall be the preparation, publication, and distribution of military books, and the performance of related activities in fact contributing to the Association's stated aims.

Adopted 14 December 1953 by the Executive Council.

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VACANCY

The Month's Mail

Responsibilities of a Great Power

To the Editors:

The JOURNAL is to be commended for publishing the Baldwin, Norman and Millis articles in your January, February and March issues. I found them most stimulating. But I must agree with the distinguished professor, extract from whose personal letter was in the March issue, that the articles did "not fully explore most of the terrible problems of national policy and strategy."

It is significant that you chose to preface Mr. Norman's article with the quotation from Secretary of State Dulles. There is little doubt that the National Security Council's basic decision was influenced largely by the inability of conventional weapons to reach a satisfactory decision in Korea even when firing ten times the amount of ammunition as the enemy. Mr. Norman probably is correct in stating "the Korean War gave the air strategists the boost they needed." For, unfortunately, in Korea the misdirection of the effort, military restraint or compelling circumstances caused the strategy to be changed from annihilation to attrition. That experience has led the public and possibly the Army to accept the premise that the United States cannot cope with Asian manpower.

This premise is not necessarily valid. Land distances and large masses of men have been overcome in the past by maneuver as well as new weapons. Surely the United States Army could develop the means and strategy to operate successfully in Asia provided there was a good purpose and the desire to undertake the venture.

The "new look" strategy appears to be based also upon the principle that American military occupation of additional continental land areas would not serve the best interests of the United States. The casualties and consumption of other resources in Korea having revealed again the immense burdens of empire, there is a new resolve to avoid or minimize the burden. Membership in and continued adherence to the United Nations organization can be explained best as an attempt by the United States to avoid some of the responsibilities of world leadership. No one knows what the destiny of the United States will be. For in spite of contrary intentions, other nations, in other times, attained the glory of empire and a golden age with attendant great consuming burdens and responsibilities.

There seems to be general agreement that the nuclear weapons can easily eliminate the glory of empire, but there is no agreement that nuclear weapons will enable a great power to avoid its responsibilities to civilization.

In humility I am reminded of a sign I once had on my office wall: "Bring your problems to me and I will complicate them for you."

COL. R. A. HOWARD, JR.,
Quartermaster Corps.

111 East 16th Street
New York 3, N. Y.

Why I Read Combat Forces Journal

To the Editors:

I was once an infantryman and subscribed to the *Infantry Journal*. I was once a cavalryman and subscribed to the *Cavalry Journal*. Now I am in the Finance Corps and subscribe to the COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL.

The first copy of COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL I ever saw was in the Air Force Officers' Club at Thule, Greenland.

Because COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL is read by enlisted men and officers of all ranks and grades of all the arms and services, I believe some platoon-level combat-action material should be presented in each issue along with some high-level military and geopolitical thought. Food for all without surfeiting one group of readers and starving others.

COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

As to technical material, I think it best that it be left to the magazines of the technical services. Liberal references should be used in order that the thread of military thinking may run through each and all of the Service publications to form an unbroken strand.

Let's stick to our professional knitting. I am confident that we military men will soon be in the sunshine again. If we spend our time wailing about what we are not now getting and about what we have lost, we shall soon become ineffective, and be tangible proof that those who have whittled away our benefits were right.

Continue to be staid and circumspect. Provide information about legislation, yes, but make it informative only.

I am in the Finance Corps, but I like to "keep up with things" in the Army.

Now I have a question: Would members of the combat arms like to hear from the "bankers and general business managers" of the Army?

COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL is a great magazine. If you aim to suit a catholicity of Army tastes I am sure you will have interest and response and the magazine will continue to thrive.

LT. COL. SIDNEY S. EASON
Finance Corps

Finance Center, U.S. Army
Indianapolis, Ind.

Poor Example of Research

To the Editors:

Gentlemen, please! Get yourselves a suspicious science or medical editor before you reprint claptrap "science" stuff. I refer to "The Human Cost of Combat" in your March issue.

That stress research team in Korea was one of the most superficial, uncoordinated, and unproductive outfits I have even seen. We built them a concrete-floor, running-water laboratory many miles behind the front. A few of the members of the team ventured up to stable positions and did a little work on men on patrols (before the patrols went out and after they came back). When fighting broke out and real stress was present, the team was in Japan to analyze a mass of data they could have readily obtained by studying a college ball team.

There was a lot of worthwhile front-line research in Korea, but this was the poorest example I know of. I was Chief of Operations, Medical Section, Eighth Army at the time.

LT. COL. DOUGLAS LINDSEY
Medical Corps

Headquarters MTC
Ft. Sam Houston, Texas

Semper Fidelis

To the Editors:

To have said U.S. Marines have a higher total casualty rate than the U.S. Army would have been a fact and easily demonstrable by statistics. A higher percentage of

You know...



I think this is it, Tom!

Remember we were talking the other day about how a serviceman might provide voluntary protection for his dependents' health? Well, I think this is the answer, Tom.

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hospital, he gets \$30 for the first day, \$10 a day thereafter. And here's the thing—he gets paid even if his dependent uses a government hospital, at a rate of \$15 the first day, \$5 a day thereafter.

He also gets up to \$300 surgical benefits for his family and allowances for doctors' hospital calls, emergency accidents, maternity, and ambulance.

There's one thing certain: it's something that men with vital military responsibility should know about, Tom. Why don't you write today for this free illustrated booklet that contains all the information? Here's the address:

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all the men in the Marine Corps see actual combat. With this must be considered the factors of length and nature of combat.

But to blithely write as you did in your "Comment" in March of "excessive combat losses" is to go beyond the facts to an evaluation of the dozens of other factors which produce casualties. It is an incredible generalization which carries the implication that perhaps tactics are basically different or Marine leadership is less competent or more bloodthirsty or some equally inane attempt which would hardly stand under professional analysis.

I hope such careless writing is simply the result of unconscious service rivalry and pride in the Army's record.

The only casualty statistics to which marines point with pride is the ratio of MIAs (includes returned POWs) to all other casualties—an interesting index of unit morale, discipline, and cohesiveness. You might compare the same Army ratio for Korea.

BRUCE LASALA

Englewood, N. J.

• The sentence to which Mr. LaSala objects reads "Our Marine friends, whose boot-training is the next toughest thing to a 49-cent steak, and who point to excessive combat losses with something suspiciously like pride, don't seem to have too much of a problem in attracting recruits." It is clear, we think, that the intent of the sentence was to praise the Corps' ability to use the hard facts of combat to attract recruits.

Specialization

To the Editors:

For some ten years I've been a fairly regular reader of the JOURNAL, without ever succumbing to the urge to write a letter for publication. But the article on Career Management—Specialization in your February issue moves me . . . if I should let myself go this letter would have to be written on asbestos.

It seems to me a symbol of out-of-date thinking that a specialist (especially an intelligence officer) is not considered to be on a par with infantry and artillery unit commanders, S3s, and others. The article says that the Army's peacetime mission is preparation for war, and the writer might have added that in wartime the mission is to win the war at the least possible cost in men and money. And on whom do we rely to tell us when we will have to fight? On intelligence officers. Who our enemy will be? Intelligence officers. Where the fighting will take place? Which weapons and how many men we will need? The answer in every case is—intelligence officers.

Probably the most irritating statement in the whole article is that a specialist must excel in his specialized field, and at the same time maintain his branch qualifications. This is just as illogical as requiring an Army surgeon to excel as a surgeon

Election of Officers

The Executive Council of the Association of the United States Army, at its regular quarterly meeting 22 March, voted to re-open election of Association officers to balloting by the Association membership.

The election of officers by the membership was suspended (under the provisions of the By-Laws) during the Korean emergency, when the velocity of transfers among the officers of the Association and members of the Executive Council made it impossible to obtain the quorum necessary to carry on Association business. It is necessary, in order to have a quorum present for Association business meetings, to limit officers and Executive Council members to persons stationed in or near Washington. Election by the membership, under emergency conditions, was too slow a process to keep the Executive Council manned to working strength.

Under the By-Laws of the Association, the Executive Council will elect a Nominating Committee in December of this year. This Committee will submit a slate of at least two nominees for each position falling vacant in 1955. The slate will be presented to the membership through the columns of the JOURNAL for voting not later than March, 1955; officers so elected will take office at the June 1955 meeting of the Executive Council.

and be qualified also as a rifle company commander, or requiring a rifle company commander to maintain qualification as a radar technician.

The only satisfactory solution to which we must come, is the creation of an Intelligence Service on the same level as the other branches. It must be composed of carefully selected officers who have already served five years or so of apprenticeship in one of the other arms or services, who have an aptitude for and liking for intelligence work. Needless to say, they must have equality of opportunity as regards promotion.

CAPTAIN G2

c/o Postmaster
New York, N. Y.

• The writer's objections should not be aimed at Career Management Division but at higher policy-making levels of the Department of the Army. The proposal is not a new one, and has been rejected for sufficient reasons by many responsible officials.

Soldier

To the Editors:

Maj. Gen. Kenneth F. Cramer, Southern Area Commander of U. S. troops in Germany, who died recently, was criticized for being a strict disciplinarian back in 1951 when he had a New England National Guard outfit at Camp Pickett. Complaints from the troops and their wives led to a couple of investigations of

his command. General Cramer had a job to do. Included in his job description was making men out of babies, undoing damage in character caused by inefficient parents, and getting his division ready for combat. He was concerned with "Combat Preparedness" and "Success in Battle" and not with USO shows and ice cream wagons. His unit was behind in training. He did something about it and he got results. The 43d Infantry Division has a good record and a good name. General Cramer's presence is still felt in that Division.

A salute and tribute to an able commander, Major General Kenneth F. Cramer, whose foremost thought was "Meet and defeat the enemy."

MAJ. GEORGE E. BANIGAN

AP0 343, San Francisco, Calif.

Sell 'em Hard

To the Editors:

I must congratulate you for "This Month's Comment" in your March issue. You have seen the light.

From 1946-1948 I had the honor to serve as Asst. PMS&T under Col. Edgar H. Keltner at the North Texas Agriculture College, Arlington, Texas. Colonel Keltner had the vision and imagination to understand what went on in a young man's heart, and the ability to let his junior officers use their own imagination and ability. Further, he was in turn backed up by Lieut. Gen. Thomas Handy, then commanding Fourth Army.

In this ROTC program, we organized a cadet corps that was so proud of itself that it was famous throughout the Southwest. Our idea was to sell the armed services to these young men, their communities, and their families. In short, we were selling the Army at the grass roots.

Among our many successful projects were:

• A crack drill team and social organization, the Sam Houston Rifles. This group was selected from the best men in the cadet corps, by nomination of the other cadets, their military and scholastic grades, and their own desires. Once each year it went to San Antonio to participate in the Battle of Flowers fiesta. While there it was housed, fed, and quartered by the Army and for all practical purposes was part of the garrison. These men never forgot this.

• The cadet corps, under the direction of Colonel Keltner, organized an annual ROTC small-bore rifle shoot. Every high school ROTC unit in Texas sent a team. It was an outstanding event in their school year. The Army sent instructors on TDY and every small town that had a boy there got plenty of newspaper coverage. The Army never was sold so well.

• The senior cadet officers in uniform were the guests of officers at local Officers' Clubs on periodic occasions.

• Fourth Army never failed to send a functionary to a major school activity. Sometimes it was General Handy himself. In this the Navy joined us.

• The Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Air and Army National Guard, plus the Army Reserve were used on every possible occasion. They furnished equipment, films, and backing galore.

We had a corps with stars in their eyes. I have seen the results of our handiwork throughout the armed forces, men who have joined the regular Navy, Air Force and Army. Some of my young men were killed in Korea, but the details of their death showed that what we had taught them they believed in. As you say, a man never forgets a thrill like being honored on a real post. These young men never did forget and they carried out the finest tradition of the service, even unto death.

MAJ. HARRY W. MORSE

USS *Eldorado*

FPO, San Francisco, Calif.

Bunker Bomb

To the Editors:

I wish to compliment your magazine and Lt. Col. Walter L. Miller, Jr., for the informative article, "Uses of Flame in Korea," in the March issue. As a former Regular Army man turned student (University of Illinois), I am a regular reader of the *JOURNAL* because of just such articles as Colonel Miller's.

I would, however, like to take exception to that part of the article that deals with the bunker bomb. While serving with Love Company, 15th Infantry, I carried and used to some extent the bunker bomb, and believe that I can speak with a certain knowledge on this subject. Colonel Miller's bomb cannot be used for maximum effectiveness because of its casing and is very unsafe because of the position of its grenade.

First, neither the caliber .50 nor .30 machine gun ammo box is suitable to obtain maximum effectiveness from the explosion. Both boxes are constructed so strongly that the force of the explosion erupts out of the weakest side, limiting the possible area of damage. Also, a good deal of the explosive force is wasted in trying to break out of the box.

My second exception—placing the grenade in such a position that neither the pin nor the handle of the grenade can be touched or held while the can is being carried. A soldier carrying a bomb in one hand would normally be carrying a rifle in his other during any approach march or on patrol. Thus the soldier would not be able to prevent the pin from coming out, the handle from flying off, or the bomb from exploding.

We found that the thin-sided caliber .30 M1 ammo can was better suited for use because it shattered, sometimes into several pieces, and the force of the grenade explosion threw the napalm in all directions more or less evenly, and over a larger area.

The grenade should be placed on the handle side of the can immediately in front of or behind the handle of the can. Then

the grenade handle can be bent over the handle of the can allowing both to be grasped at one time with one hand. Even if the pin is then pulled, through some accident, the bomb cannot go off.

All that is needed to make these bombs, besides the can, WP grenade and napalm, is an iron spike to make the holes, a soldering iron and solder for the lid. First, two holes, one for the grenade and one to pour in the napalm, are punched in the handle side of the can, the grenade is inserted and its handle bent into place. The side which was first removed in opening the can is soldered on securely. It is a good idea to also solder the two metal pieces holding the handle. This is an extra and sometimes necessary safety precaution. The napalm is then poured into the can and a stopper of wood wrapped in a bit of cloth is wedged into the hole. It must be tight and must not stick out too far.

This bomb, and variations which included both the faults I find in the Colonel's bomb, was used by a test squad (of which I was a member) from the 15th Infantry.

SGT. ROBERT M. LAUTH
USAR

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Our soldiers are no longer the highest paid in the world. An unofficial study by a Finance Corps' officer shows that in some grades, principally the non-commissioned and lower commissioned ranks, Canadian soldiers get higher pay than U.S. soldiers. For example, a Canadian sergeant married with one dependent and occupying government family quarters gets \$194 a month; his U.S. opposite number draws \$178.24. A U.S. captain with one dependent, serving overseas and separated from his family, is paid \$428.64 as compared with a Canadian captain's \$443. Canadian dollars are worth more than U.S. dollars, so the actual difference is greater than the figures indicate.

The line between strategic and tactical air is disappearing, General Nathan Twining, the Air Force Chief of Staff, told a Senate subcommittee. He said that in a future war the tactical forces "may well take and give the first air blows." It is the objective of the Air Force, he said, to equip every "offensive fighter and bomber aircraft of our tactical forces to deliver nuclear weapons of all sizes on tactical targets." He also said that strategic forces are adaptable to tactical use.

"Area fire" versus "aimed fire" of the caliber .45 pistol is a subject of hot controversy in the *Military Police Journal*. Also involved is the question of whether military policemen are or are not "deplorable marksmen" as some officers of the Corps have attested. These officers say that the "area aim" method taught at the Provost Marshal General's School is largely responsible. Pointing out that the controversy is similar to that which raged in the columns of the "COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL and infantry circles" during the first year or so of the Korean conflict, Lt. Col. William P. Dunn wrote in the MP magazine that the infantry soon "started and has continued an intensive program to improve infantry marksmanship." He wants the MPs to do the same. "The importance of and necessity for policemen being able to hit what they shoot at seems to be gen-

erally recognized in all police agencies except our Corps," he wrote. In conclusion he said: "Let's take a tip from the infantry and get back to the basic principles and practices of traditional American shooting."

In a White Paper issued to Parliament the British Minister of Defense said: "The Army has to bear the main burden of the cold war, though both the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force have their parts to play. . . . None of the Services can be reduced in size or efficiency to such a point that it would cease to make an effective contribution to the deterrent or to provide a sound basis for mobilization." The Paper said that the Ministry expects to increase the size of the Army from 220,100 to 226,400 in the next year. It observed: "There will also have to be an improvement in all three Services in the numbers of men prolonging their current engagements if the increasing shortage of NCOs and skilled tradesmen is to be made good."

Because Lieut. Gen. Lauris Norstad, deputy commander of NATO for air, has expressed a need for a "lightweight," "day-superiority" fighter for close-support missions, U.S. and British designers are again in controversy over the merits of such a plane, the magazine *Aviation Week* reports. Such a plane should weigh 5,000 lbs. empty, as compared with contemporary U.S. fighters which


are from three to six times heavier. U.S. designers say it is more than merely "stripping off gadgets." A British "light fighter"—the "Gnat"—is soon to fly. Other European aviation firms are also in the running for such a plane, the magazine says. General Norstad's specifications are reported to require armament of either paired 20mm cannon with 200 rounds; paired 30mm cannon with 120 rounds; or 12 three-inch rockets plus two 500-lb. bombs plus two napalm bombs.

Hanson Baldwin of The New York Times is the vanguard of those who believe that the military services are suffering from a shortage of the old military verities. Among his other suggestions for improving the services is to "bring back the bands" and have more martial music. However, the Air Force either doesn't read the Times or isn't influenced by it, for it is going to reduce the number of Air Force bands by twenty-five per cent. It says it will save enough manpower to staff a fighter wing and still have plenty of music by having traveling bands that move from base to base.

How many authorized Army newspapers do you think there are? A recent tabulation reveals that there are 467. Here's a breakdown:

Daily	U.S.	Overseas
Letterpress or offset process	0	3
Mimeograph or ditto process	29	39
Weekly, semiweekly or biweekly		
Letterpress or offset process	38	39
Mimeograph or ditto process	47	145
Monthly or semimonthly		
Letterpress or offset process	16	15
Mimeograph or ditto process	33	35
Frequency of publication unknown	15	13
Totals	178	289

Many of the mimeograph or ditto papers are little more than daily or weekly "poop sheets" but they are listed as authorized Army newspapers in the records of the Department of the Army Office of Publication Information.



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compute its speed, altitude and course in seconds . . . then, automatically aiming itself, shoot the plane out of the sky.

■ Actually the story began when Army Ordnance anticipated the threat of faster flying jets and started to work with Sperry on the problem. Through its pioneering in radar, Sperry engineers were able to design the "eyes" of needed performance. From Sperry's experience in electronics came the "brains" to compute precise firing information. Sperry's developments in servo mechanisms provided the "muscles" for rapid aiming and firing.

■ The Skysweeper gunfire control system which resulted from the cooperative efforts of Army Ordnance and Sperry is typical of the many systems which Sperry has developed working with various branches of the military to meet critical needs. Once developed, Sperry manufacturing specialists convert engineering designs into precision weapons for large scale production. Among similar projects at Sperry today are systems for bombing and navigation, missile guidance and naval gunfire control.

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THE ARMY IS STILL IN BUSINESS

BUT IT MUST "SELL" ITSELF IF IT IS TO STAY SOLVENT

WHAT really is new about our strategy and force structure? We still have an Army, a Navy, and an Air Force. Is it so startling that an end to the fighting in Korea should bring a reduction in the Army, and likely some cut-back in the Navy? It would be foolish to say that the Army's combat readiness will not suffer seriously from budget and strength reductions. But the reductions need not be catastrophic if the Army will make the most of what it has, and if the trend does not get out of hand.

This is not an attempt to adjudge the soundness of the relative strengths of the services. However, a brief look is revealing. Even with forecast reductions, the Army will be well over a million men strong and the Navy will continue as the world's most formidable flotilla. The Army and Navy remain very much in business. As for the Air Force, all major phases of air power have been under development continuously since World War II. For Air Force development to go apace, with renewed emphasis on its strongest weapon—strategic nuclear weapons—is no more remarkable than the mounting importance placed by the Navy on atomic-powered submarines, or by the Army on atomic artillery. All three of the services have been developing and adopting new weapons, equipment, tactics, and techniques since mid-World War II. The

new weapons are *additions* to our arsenals, not outright substitutions.

Does the 1954 "new look" imply a major change in our military weapons, strategy, and structure? Manpower and money ceilings placed upon the several services have changed from the year before, but this is the case every year. What counts is that the integrated concepts of national security which have been painfully and carefully evolved over a period of nearly ten years should not be scrapped by the turn of a catch phrase or a single year's budget!

As General Ridgway told the Senate Appropriations Committee in March of this year, the current reduction in Army funds is not accompanied by a reduction in Army functions. It is noteworthy that the press widely questioned the "new look" and supported General Ridgway's observation that the Army's job was in no way minimized. Even so, the "new look" certainly has caused concern and confusion in both military and civilian circles.

A survey of the actual strengths, functions, and deployments of the armed forces should provide assurance beyond the sound and fury: United States military power today is actively supporting national policy at home and abroad and as near to the borders of the Communist empires as can reasonably be expected. Quite apart from the obvious reliance that we place on our allies, the United States has found it necessary to exercise its total power with, among other things, very large elements of

The authors of this article are two field-grade regulars, one infantry and the other artillery.

We must face up to the fact that the myth that armies are outmoded lingers on

its Army, Navy, and Air Force. All three services are standing ready in such far-flung regions as the Mediterranean, Western Europe, the Far East, and the Arctic. It ought to be apparent that the size and importance of the several services cannot be fixed, but must vary with location and task; and it is clear that each has an indispensable part to play in each major region. Considered as a whole, United States military power at home and abroad is an *integrated force* in which the three major elements are balanced *against the tasks to be done*.

CALL it function, task, mission, or what you will—the business charged to each service now and in the event of war is what determines balance. If the U.S. is to survive it must have military forces capable of performing the *wide variety* of things that must be done to support national policy. Security in 1954 is not reducible to an “either-or” solution. No service alone can do the whole job; there is more than enough for all three. Because modern military operations are almost invariably carried out by armed forces working in combination, it is incontestable that a functional balance must exist—as it does—among the land, sea, and air forces. Yet this concept is in danger of being discarded for a new strategy in which we prepare for only one kind of conflict: one in which our main power will be the weight of retaliatory air forces armed with nuclear weapons. The great fallacy is that this concept cannot be related to any acceptable national objectives. A strategy that would not bring advantageous results to the United States is simply unsound. Many authorities have branded the extreme air concept of mass destruction as the least desirable basket in which to put our eggs. Apart from morality, a strategy relying chiefly on nuclear weapons cannot guarantee success. Such a war would end in a Pyrrhic victory. Even though the Army and Navy continue to exist in some strength, the 1954 budget tends to limit our strategic capabilities to mass destruction, to unlimited and useless war. The die is not yet cast hard, for the shape of the armed forces is determined several years prior to a current budget. But the drift toward a strategy of total and mutually destructive war is strong. It must be checked and a more realistic plan adopted.

Our national objectives include the limiting of war. If we must fight, it should be for an end that will increase the chances for peace and eliminate the seeds of further conflict. Military men must join with statesmen in a new crusade—a wise and deliberate campaign to keep the scope and horror of war at a minimum. The great upheavals of global war must be avoided if any vestige of peace is to return to the world. Balanced forces that will permit the free world to trade its present defensive strategy for an offensive effort in which various forms of force can be applied as positive deterrents to war and as guardians of peace. Therefore, the U.S. must have balanced forces if it is to exercise wise and influential leadership.

Perhaps the reluctance to accept the inevitability of “balanced forces” is a part of the American love of slogans like “first things first,” and the desire to put things in neat packages. Our military readiness must have a firmer foundation than the drifting sands of day-to-day crises and wishful thinking. We dare not fall back on the whimsical practices that traditionally have kept the United States unprepared.

Let this be understood: there is no basis for a drastic new look. The trend toward a soberly-calculated policy should be nourished, not sickened by a huckster’s slogan. With the lessons of Korea all too fresh in our minds, America needs to be assured that a violent and unreasoned switch has not occurred in our integrated plans for national security.

WHERE, now, does this inquiry lead? Well, the Army is deeply affected by the threatened misconception, because it minimizes the Army. Soldiers may rightly scoff at the suggestion that land forces are outmoded. But they must face up to the fact that the myth lingers on, even in the face of land wars in Greece, Israel, Indochina, Burma, Malaya, and Korea (not to mention the NATO land forces in Western Europe).

That the “outmoded Army” idea disturbs the morale and integrity of the Army is important but not paramount; worse storms have been weathered. The very practical reason why the Army must object is the danger of a recurrence of the neglect which sent it into Korea with a shoestring force. It is hard to understand why that instance of gross neglect has failed to convince all Americans that we cannot risk the neglect of any of the major services.

The Army’s case is sound, but it has not been made with sufficient vigor. Unfortunately, the Army continues to appear before the public as an inferior member of the team, a position which it does not occupy and cannot accept. The popular belief in air power is the chief cause of this. And most unfortunately, this tends to place the Army in the distasteful position of disagreeing with air power supporters when as a matter of fact there is no real disagreement. The Army believes strongly in air power. The conflict arises because understanding of true air power capabilities is not widespread and therefore, it is fallaciously assumed that “air power” can do the job of armies, and that mass armies cannot exist when the enemy has superior air power.

These notions of the air-power-over-all theory, as they affect the Army, should have been destroyed once and for all by the record of what happened in Korea. It was (and still is) fashionable to argue that the Western World could not hope to match the “human wave” tactics and “unlimited” manpower of the “mass armies” of Communism; therefore the U.S. should not waste money on an Army, but concentrate on air power. Until Korea, the United States Army was without experience that

The Army must show that it has plans to use atomic weapons in future wars

could reply to this. It was confident, though, that an Army that concentrated on quality of men and weapons could offset a considerable superiority in strength. Once we got into high gear in Korea, we proved that point. The Red masses were by no means invincible, and the smaller Eighth Army took their measure time and time again.

We should have learned from Korea that the scientific "progress" in killing finally reduces war to a struggle on the ground. Korea proved again that nothing but determined infantry, properly supported, can stop other men on the ground. The Chinese armies in Korea exploded the theory that no army can live without air superiority. Good infantry can and will press (or be driven) forward in the darkness, in bad weather, and under cover, without regard to their losses, against the full power of superior air forces. Air supremacy on the battlefield is highly desirable but not always decisive. Although United States air (and sea) power in Korea was virtually unchallenged, the numerically greater Red armies, while hurt, were not paralyzed by this superiority.

AIR advocates explain that Korea was a unique situation. Indeed, it was uniquely in our favor—an ideal situation in which to bring our air (and sea) power to bear. As necessary as was the fine air and naval support, the fact remains that it still took large ground forces to check Red aggression in Korea.

The experience in Korea confirmed the Army's unshaken belief that a well-led, mobile, hard-hitting land force, equipped with the latest weapons and *supported by superior air and naval forces*, can handle ordinary land forces of much greater size than itself.

However, air power extremists haven't shown a reciprocal appreciation of the Army's role in gaining and maintaining command of the air.

We can be certain that the Soviets are alive to the role of land forces. The Soviets doubtless are restrained somewhat by America's superiority in producing atomic weapons and aircraft. But, since they view our advantage also as a principal obstacle to their plans of world domination, the Soviets are exerting every effort to overcome our superiority if such it is. Methods of neutralizing our atomic supremacy and stopping our strategic bombers must be occupying the time of Soviet military planners, scientists, and production specialists. Our entire outlook must be governed by this: *The Soviets have made much faster progress than expected in both fields.*

We cannot be sure how we do compare in nuclear air power, but our 1948 complacency is somewhat out of date today. When both sides have enough mass-destruction weapons to wage atomic war, the military value of such weapons may become neutralized. In any case, the Communists, with their lesser regard for life and their large populations, may be better prepared to absorb the losses of such a war than the West. Nevertheless, the United States has no choice but to invest heavily in these

weapons. Soldiers will agree to the wisdom of our nuclear program. What they do object to is the recurrent neglect of land forces.

At the end of World War II, Moscow perceived and exploited fully the West's greatest weakness—the absence of adequate armies. So the Soviet and satellite armies were put to the task of furthering the definite political aims of Communism. The pattern is clear in Eastern Europe, China and North Korea. If Indochina is saved for the free world it will not be by the threat of "massive retaliation" but by men on the ground.

A reduction in NATO land forces, especially those of the United States, would bring joy to the Kremlin. The NATO build-up that began in 1950 was a serious setback for the Communists. The Red armies in Europe became checkmated to a degree and they must be dealt with before further Soviet aggression can succeed.

It is significant that Soviet effort to duplicate the American atomic potential is not being made at the expense of Communist land forces.

THE relationship between armies and nuclear weapons can be put in this way: Will Soviet armies be stopped if the United States and Soviet Russia fight a duel with nuclear bombs, homeland to homeland? Nuclear weapons cannot stop armies in the field unless those armies are made to concentrate, and the Red armies will not concentrate unless forced to by sizable Allied armies.

This establishes the need for land forces in modern war. If America's allies could provide all the land forces needed to check Communist land power, the United States could properly reduce its Army. However, this is impossible now and improbable in the foreseeable future.

There is a need for a loud, clear call for adequate land forces. We must emphasize the Army's full belief in and reliance on tactical atomic weapons to an extent unprecedented in the history of new weapons. The Army's war plans, training programs, organizational and strategic concepts all provide for the new weapons. The Army has placed such faith in these weapons that it is staking its part of the future security of the United States on them. When the United States Army is that confident in weapons which have never been tested in battle, the potentialities of the new weapons cannot be said to have been neglected.

Yet Major General James Gavin has written: "The addition of atomic weapons of catastrophic possibilities and an increasing degree of air mobility for land forces, the shield—the national shield—on the field of battle must be incomparably thicker, tougher, and more resilient. . . . Forces in being of a strength considered adequate to delay while the nation mobilizes in terms of World War II yardsticks, will invite disaster. . . . Since the USSR now is in a position to employ tactical atomic weapons . . . the conclusion is inescapable . . . *additional land and air forces will be needed.* . . . There appears to be no

The Army must evolve a dynamic doctrine that will win public support

avoiding this conclusion, however unpleasant it is to our economists and politicians."

So much for the main theme. In the Atomic Age, land forces seem to have a clearer role than ever before. If anything can be called *evident* in these confusing days, the purpose of the United States Army surely emerges from any honest inquiry.

But having come this far, what next?

THE Army requires a living doctrine on which its own convictions can flourish and public support be won. The Army needs to know the principles on which it stands. Let us attempt to outline them.

Flexible Military Structure. The United States must have a military structure capable of meeting the most likely kind of emergency, but also able to react to the unforeseeable. It should be designed to support the national objectives; conversely, it should be such as not to work contrary to those objectives. U.S. strategy should aim at winning peace as well as war. In any case, we cannot risk preparing for *only one kind* of war.

Vital Roles for Land, Sea, and Air Forces. There are certain functions in war which only an army can perform, just as there are functions which only an air force and a navy can perform. Recognition of this precept is given in the unification of the services and in the fact that all three services today, though large, have missions that tax all their strength.

Key Role of Armies. It is significant that every major military action or threat to world peace since 1945 has been made with land forces. Unless allied land power (which means the continued presence of U.S. Army forces) is able to withstand Communist armies on the ground, the chances of mounting an effective offensive are slight. The West must have enough land power in being *at the start* of a war to prevent defeat at the outset. This is a fundamental presupposition of the major political, economic, moral, and military affiliations of the people of the United States as represented in the actions of their government.

This means for the United States a new concept of war. For the first time in our history we must have forces in being at the outset of a war. We can no longer count on having time to mobilize. It is this change in circumstances that Americans find hard to accept. In Communist thinking, the conflict has already been joined. The warning has been issued repeatedly. Like it or not, the United States must be ready to fight at any and all times. This means an Army of respectable size, fully prepared. We cannot risk the future devoid of a sizable army in being. This is the true "new look."

The land battle, along with the air and sea battles, is an integral part of the effort to gain command of the land, sea, and air in decisive areas. The timing or priority of any phase or campaign of a future war depends too much on the circumstances to be predicted. There is no such thing as separate land-, sea-, or air-phases. The

initial loss of the battle on land in any decisive area of conflict could well contribute to our defeat in the air or at sea; the reverse is also true. If we lose in the air or sea we may be defeated on the ground. Further, the land forces must be of such strength and so disposed as to ensure that the *political* objectives of the nation are not lost in the initial phases of war. Political aims, whether they can be attained short of war or whether they must be fought for, cannot be reached without land forces. And if we lose our political objectives, there can be no point in fighting at all!

THE responsibility for raising and maintaining armies lies with the Congress and ultimately with the people. And while the American people have shown that they will support all measures required to insure the nation's safety, they are insufficiently aware of the essential role of land forces. Unless the Army presents facts and recommendations to the people, it is, in effect, usurping the people's right to decide for themselves. It can be expected that the civilian officials of the government will respect the Army's non-political nature and permit professionally determined military judgments and requirements to be stated. The Army has no right to bow to expediency; it must present its case.

A major reason for the Army's ineffectiveness in gaining public support is a reluctance to take a firm stand on controversial subjects. Inevitably there crop up differences of opinion on the best way to prevent or win wars. Inescapably, there arise controversies over which service is best qualified to do this or that function. Controversy of itself is not reprehensible; only when unfair, accusatory, and dishonest methods are used to settle it should controversy be prohibited. The very definition of unification automatically makes the Army an interested party to almost any inter-service difference of opinion. Admirable as it may be to avoid "scrap," by remaining aloof the Army denies the nation the benefit of the land-force viewpoint. A negative attitude on controversies may well suggest that the Army is equivocal and spineless. Can the Army's conciliatory position on unification disputes be shown to have improved public opinion of the Army? The record is emphatic! When controversy revolves around issues vital to the nation and the Army, the spokesmen for land power must not remain silent.

Our national strategy must have public approval and confidence; the size, composition and roles of our armed forces must be substantially acceptable to the people.

The issues brought out in the so-called inter-service quarrels usually are not matters that the military departments alone *should* decide upon. They are of such great importance that the people and their elected representatives have the duty to participate in determining them.

The Army must henceforth stand up and clearly speak its piece. Others will judge it; but only the Army can make its own case.



Reserves in Atomic Warfare

BRIGADIER GENERAL GEORGE E. LYNCH

Reserves will be attractive targets for thermonuclear weapons, and so their disposition and mission must necessarily be altered

AT this moment in atomic history, the Army finds itself with a weapon first developed for uses not intimately related to combat on the ground. Consequently, ground forces must adapt their doctrines to the effects, both offensive and defensive, of the several types of atomic missiles that are capable of being effectively used on the ground battlefield.

A complete and flawless theory of the tactics of atomic missiles in ground warfare is not likely to be evolved in one neat package, designed overnight by an inspired group of military scientists. Rather, these tactics promise to emerge, bit by bit, by empirical means in the many compartments which together make up the tactics of ground action.

BRIGADIER GENERAL GEORGE E. LYNCH, an occasional contributor to these columns (this is his third article in the past seven months), is Assistant Division Commander of the 43d Infantry Division in Europe.

It is the intention of this piece to explore the effects of atomic missiles on ground force reserves in the theater of war, and to develop some principles which will harmonize current doctrine and the employment of atomic missiles. To provide a common orientation point, this examination assumes the system of ground forces organization which the U. S. Army has today. It is quite probable that other ventures into the study of atomic ground warfare will conclude that one of the essential adaptations is a radical change in our military organization and in its forms and functions. However, in the matter of ground force reserves, the principles and the objectives to be brought out in this discussion should retain credibility, regardless of the form of military organization.

SINCE we are scrutinizing ground force reserves in atomic warfare, let us agree that reserves are those combat forces assigned to a commander which he has not committed to action or to the use of another commander.

The reserve force is to be found in every infantry and armored combat unit from company through division and in all combat formations above the division. Fairly obviously, the reserve exists to exploit offensive successes, to shore up defensive reserves, and to make it possible to give rest and revitalization to troops who have expended their energies and resources. These purposes seem to remain unshaken by the impact of atomic action. It is also significant that only recently the rifle company's "support" platoon changed its identity to "reserve" platoon, with the result that it is to be viewed as a dynamic, flexible element in contrast to its traditional role of a static, fixed force.

RESERVES in the battalion and on up through the division have ideally been at about a third or a quarter of the troop strength at each echelon. As often as not, reserves at these levels have been nonexistent or nearly so. In older wars of the 20th century, the number of divisions in corps, army, army group and theater reserves tended to approximate a third of the total number of divisions situated in the theater. But in World War II, the pattern differed sharply. The European Theater of Operations luxuriated in the few instances when it could lay claim to as much as ten per cent of its divisions being in strategic reserve. Corps and field armies were frequently fully committed. Reserves of divisions frequently doubled in harness by being counted as both division and corps reserve. This diminution of the reserve principle resulted in a very delicate balance which fortunately never became unseated. Perhaps the Western Allies' heavy preponderance of air strength served to relax the traditional need for ground force reserves. The unknown factors in this equation defy a mathematical solution. However, the total result was quite apparent. Strangely, the poverty of ground forces seemed to force the Western Allies to a strategy of continuous attack, for they were too weak to indulge in a deliberate intentional defense. Some general once said, "I am not strong enough to defend, therefore I must attack." Clausewitz also called the defense the stronger form of warfare.

The paucity of Western Allies' ground reserves in the Second World War, and the partial fulfillment of the reserve role by air forces did not eliminate the need for these missing reserves. This was most clearly and alarmingly demonstrated when Field Marshal Von Rundstedt launched the Battle of the Bulge. Theater reserves rushed to the battle, but these divisions were far too few for the task. Then, General Patton's Third Army performed a most remarkable movement. Within four days, six divisions of Third Army vacated their positions in which they had been in close engagement with German forces, and moved distances of as much as 100 miles, into action against the penetration. Third Army and its southern neighbor, Seventh Army, thinned out their forces, almost all of which were in active contact with the German armies, and in a general sliding movement to the north reorganized a continuous but greatly weakened front in Alsace and Lorraine. Third Army's six divisions had become in fact Theater reserves. Because

of the flexibility of the several army commanders and the motorized and mechanized mobility of their troops, units already committed in the front lines became Theater reserves and quickly intervened to save a situation which otherwise could have been catastrophic. Perhaps this action was the primitive origin of what may become the pattern of reserve forces in atomic warfare. It is extremely significant, and the principles involved will receive further attention later in this examination.


Reserves in atomic warfare retain their traditional purposes; however, the characteristics of atomic missiles introduce certain changes of reserve forces' locations and missions. Both in attack and in defense, reserves have been nominated as profitable atomic targets. Attractiveness as an atomic target will depend on the location and the formation of a particular reserve force. The economics of atomic warfare are still somewhat intangible, so measurement of the results of atomic attacks against ground force reserves, in relation to the resources expended in the fabrication of the missile, is not too meaningful. Tactical advantages to be gained by atomic elimination of selected reserve forces may be so great that measurement again cannot be expressed in specific terms. These matters must still fall into the fields of leadership and military art. Nevertheless, a local reserve of infantry battalion strength would seem to be a profitable atomic target if it is in position to exercise decisive influence on an action of importance, and if it is so disposed that an atomic missile could destroy or incapacitate the battalion.

Reserve battalions of front-line regiments have, in the past, almost habitually been located so as best to anticipate the ground action, and have been disposed in a battalion mass for ease of communications, control and battlefield administration. This tendency is probably a carry-over from older times, for modern communications and motor transport have long since erased the need for compact reserve formations. In fact, even aside from atomic considerations, how much better a front line regiment is prepared to handle local reverses if its reserve battalion is disposed laterally in company masses! In this case, no matter where the point of enemy penetration or envelopment, the regiment has a force (reinforced company) reasonably close to the threat and capable of acting as a blocking force while the remainder of the reserve battalion is hastened to the scene to complete the mission. There is also an additional advantage in time and space, in that, being disposed laterally in company masses, the battalion is virtually already in a dispersed column formation which can start moving in any desired direction simultaneously *by company*, whereas a battalion in a compact formation must uncoil and the movement does not start until its slowest company is ready. Figure 1 diagrams the regimental atomic and traditional formations.

THE same principles and time and space factors noted above apply in the case of the infantry regiment in reserve, whether it is backing up the front line or is part of a division which is itself in reserve. The infantry regiment, by being dispersed in battalion masses behind the front line, can quickly bring the weight of a full in-

REGIMENT ON THE FRONT LINE

ATOMIC FORMATION



TRADITIONAL FORMATION




FIGURE 1

fantry battalion to bear at any part of the front or of the battle position while the remaining two battalions are put in motion to perform their assigned missions. Companies within these battalions achieve the same readiness and tactical advantages as outlined above for the regimental reserve battalion if they are in company masses.

These formations are not intended to resemble in any way the pre-World War II "Battalion Reserve Line" and "Regimental Reserve Line." Those were static in concept whereas these formations possess mobility and readiness. Figure 2 shows divisional atomic and traditional formations.

Masses smaller than company size are not suggested, for the company in battle is truly the smallest unit which contains within itself most of the means for providing its day-to-day needs.

The advantages cited above for the dispersion of local reserves have been viewed with regard to normal as well as to atomic effects. The vulnerability of reserves to atomic attack compels dispersion which compounds the advantages inherent in the dispersed form in reserve forces.

THEATER reserves have, in previous wars, been located with regard to strategic threats and so that the limited mobility of foot and horse elements could match the calls made upon them. Also extended supply lines probably influenced the selection of theater reserve locations. These locations were apt to be central and very deep. These older wars were sometimes characterized by the absence of the continuous front which appeared in World Wars I and II. Deep central reserves were therefore a strategic necessity.

In future wars, the creation and maintenance of a continuous front promises to be a normal and primary objective of a prudent theater commander. Mobile reserves can achieve their missions equally as well by lateral movements parallel to the front from positions close up, as they can from central positions deep in the rear. If the theater, army group and field army commanders have guessed well, their reserves can be placed close to those parts of the front which are most critical. At the same

time, motorized mobility will allow these forward reserves to speed to unanticipated distant situations, much in the manner of Third Army's rush to the Battle of the Bulge.

An enemy airborne capability will require the retention of some deep reserves.

The user of atomic missiles will, no doubt, select his tactical objectives and areas of decisive action as guided by existing principles of war. His atomic missiles may be used to pierce the enemy lines, or to eliminate the reserves which are capable of intervening in the area of decisive action or, if he is well endowed atomically, for both courses of action, separately or together.

In the atomic attack, the attacker will likely ready his exploitation forces to rush into the vacuum created by atomic penetration of the lines. If his atomic attack was aimed at the local reserves, with ground forces making a penetration of the front lines, exploitation forces will similarly be prepared to advance in conjunction with the atomic blow at the local reserves. In the attacker's case, the key will be the readiness of mobile exploitation forces (whether airborne, helicopter, armored or motorized or a combination of these) and precise timing of the atomic blow to permit exploitation when the situation is most ready.

The defender must be so deployed and prepared that his reserves are not destroyed by the atomic attack; or, if key reserves are destroyed, that other forces can quickly intervene and carry on the mission of the destroyed reserves. At the same time, the defender's own atomic means will be geared to a counter-move against the attacker's reserves which will have been assembled to exploit the attack. In both cases, rapid and sound intelligence media are obvious requisites, and flexibility and rapidity of delivery of atomic missiles will be decisive.

Reserves of the defending forces must, then, be located close to the front so that those reserves which may have been eliminated by atomic blasts can be quickly replaced by lateral movement of mobile reserves of adjacent units—as in the case, again, of Third Army's action in the Battle of the Bulge. This points to an added mission for every front-line or local reserve force—that of specifically

being prepared and mobilized to replace the reserves of adjacent divisions and corps. The reserves of field armies and higher echelons will, as always, be prepared for any emergency in their respective areas or sector, but they must, like the local reserves, be prepared and mobilized for instant maneuver to restore the situation where mass atomic attacks may have wiped out the local reserves of sizeable portions of the front.


IN the defense, frontages and depths of battle positions will usually be of such generous proportions that no unusual difficulties will be found in situating reserves so that congested and inviting targets are not created. However, in the attack, there exists a common impulse for all supporting troops and local reserves to crowd the battle position. Commanders of these elements strive commendably to offer and to accomplish the most rapid service possible. Reinforcing artillery units, as well as those belonging to the attacking divisions, are compelled to seek positions quite close to the front in order to support the attack to the limits of their maximum range. Impetus of the attack will depend, in part, on continuing close follow-up by these same artillery units. Reserves which have been charged with exploitation or relief missions must similarly crowd the area close to the front so as to be able to execute their respective missions on short notice, and without delay or loss of time. In addition to the straining of all these units against the front, the width of this front must necessarily be considerably less than that of a defensive front in order to bring to bear the preponderance of force necessary to overcome the enemy resistance. Something must give—the contents exceed the capacity of the package! The only flexible dimensions in the problem appear to be time and the depth of corps and division zones. Conventional depths of zone used in World War II and in the pattern of maneuvers in 1953 simply cannot be followed or used as guides in atomic warfare. The rear boundaries of corps and divisions must move farther to the rear to provide room for tolerable troop densities. The additional rearward spaces thus provided must become the reservation

of service units of the corps and divisions. The more forward areas vacated or made available by the relocation of service troops will provide living and operating room to local reserves and to supporting artillery units.

The dimensions of the areas required to provide living and operating room to attacking infantry and armor, to artillery and to service-support types can be determined. The factors will vary according to the terrain, the forces involved and the estimates of enemy atomic capabilities. Somewhere the decision must be made. Army units participating will usually be assigned to the corps. Units reinforcing the divisions will come from the corps, and other corps units will perform corps missions in the divisional areas. It seems clear, then, that the corps commander must compute the requirements for space in the divisional areas and must locate the divisional rear boundaries sufficiently deep to avoid congestion at the front. At the same time, he must coordinate precisely the movements of corps units whose missions require them to operate in the divisional areas. The resulting trend toward division rear boundaries farther to the rear might cause congestion in the area between division and corps rear boundaries unless the field army headquarters allows its corps latitude in establishing corps rear boundaries. The same degree of latitude will be necessary in the case of field army rear boundaries, although these are usually so far to the rear that atomic considerations will probably not affect them.

AT this point, some of us may wonder at the difference between this concept of the organization of a front, and the concept of a deployment of troops wherein a perimeter or stronghold is formed, securing its service troops and installations within the position. This discussion so far has been predicated on the ability to create and maintain a continuous front. In event that the continuous front collapses or is seriously penetrated, troops must be capable of redeploying, either in the position or at a new location after withdrawal, into self-sustaining secure strongholds.

The pattern of a corps in action in atomic warfare as



A TYPE CORPS IN ACTION

Battle Position
Rear of Battle Position

Division Rear Area

Division Rear Boundary

Corps Rear Area

Corps Rear Boundary

FIGURE 3

All Infantry, Artillery and Armored elements of the Corps and its Divisions in this area.

All Divisional service elements in this area.

All Corps service elements in this area.

part of a continuous front is depicted in Figure 3. Its significance is threefold. The first is the elongation of the area from front-line regiments to corps rear boundary—this effect is not measurable in the diagram, but has just been discussed and is a critical factor in the planning at corps headquarters. The second effect is the specific compartmentation of the battle position as a preserve for corps and divisional combat units; the division rear area for the location of divisional service units; and the corps rear area for corps service units and army service units supporting or attached to the corps. The third effect is the form of deployment of the four divisions of the corps. All of the combat units of the corps are in the battle position. The two center divisions are disposed in normal "two up and one back" formation. The two flank divisions are in columns of regiments. Essentially the two rear regiments of the flank divisions form the corps reserve. In event of atomic attack against the corps, whether it be against the regiments in enemy contact, or against the regiments in rear, there is a regiment nearby which can beat the enemy to the hole if one has been created in the front line; or can move to replace another rear regiment if it has been so damaged that it cannot carry on its mission. It is also seen that each flank division is already in column formation prepared to move as a division to any desired point of action, in or out of the corps zone. This move can be initiated at once by the rear regiments of the division. Meanwhile the committed regiment of the division is relieved by the neighboring division's reserve regiment, or a part of it so as to retain a division reserve in the neighboring division. In atomic attack, whether the corps be the recipient or the user, time is the most vital factor and this sort of disposition of the corps provides the optimum of time. Figure 3 shows a type corps deployed for atomic action.

The pattern discussed above is only a pattern, and there will be variations to suit the terrain and the strength of the forces in attack and in defense. The unchanging factors will be the location of corps reserves in the forward areas, and organizational arrangements which permit rapid entry into local atomic situations, and disengagement of divisions for action elsewhere.

The typical corps deployment shown in Figure 3 might be thought to withhold too many regiments from enemy contact because of the column formation of the flank divisions. The formation shows only six of twelve regiments with enemy contact. In conventional deployment of the corps, it would be expected that the corps would place one of its four divisions in a relatively deep central reserve position. If the three-line divisions deploy conventionally, there will result six regiments on the line, which of course is the same front-line strength as in this atomic deployment of the corps.

ATOMIC action in ground warfare, as it has been discussed here, promises to require some sharp changes in functional thinking of field commanders. At present, decisions regarding the use of atomic missiles themselves tend to be vested in corps and higher commanders. No strong reasons for downgrading these decisions to division level are apparent. However, the deployment of divisional elements has traditionally been a responsibility of the division commander—and division commanders may not look kindly on what they could regard as a corps intrusion into division responsibilities. The maxim, "give the commander the mission and the means and let him determine how he will accomplish his mission," will not survive in atomic war. Corps commanders will necessarily find themselves charged with greater intimacy in the direction of operations of their divisions.

STRATEGY


COLONEL JOHN L. POWERS

Moltke's annotation of Jomini's theory fits today's situation:

The power and velocity of the new weapons gives the exterior position of the free world an opportunity to encircle the inner position of the Communist world

COLONEL JOHN L. POWERS, Infantry, presently a student at the Army War College, is a 1937 graduate of the Military Academy.

INNER LINES: STRENGTH



T H OR WEAKNESS



THE position on the earth's surface of the two conflicting worlds—free and slave—is of vital interest to all soldiers. Certainly a consideration of the spatial relationship of the two in terms of the more powerful and faster weapons that have emerged is of first importance. More specifically this requires giving thought to the question of whether the theory of interior lines retains the validity advanced by Jomini.

The Communist world covers about one-third of the earth's land surface, is fairly compact and centrally located in relation to the bulk of the land areas of the earth. It is poorly situated to control the seas and the air.

The free world covers about two-thirds of the earth's land surface, is widely distributed and dependent upon the seas for communication between its parts. It is favorably situated to control the seas and the air.

In short, the Communist world is an interior position and the free world an exterior position.

This leads naturally to a consideration of the theory of interior lines. The chief exponent of that theory was Jomini, who wrote: "An army whose lines are interior and closer together than those of the enemy can by a strategic movement overwhelm the enemy forces one after the other

by reuniting alternately the mass of its forces." Clausewitz, although admitting that the theory was based "on the truth that the engagement is the only effectual means in war" nevertheless rejected it as "another instance of one-sided theory which was never able to govern real life."

The Prussian campaign against Austria in 1866, directed by Moltke, demonstrated rather decisively that the advantage of interior lines was only of relative significance. Moltke's words on the subject were: "The unquestionable advantages of the inner line of operations are valid only as long as you retain enough space to advance against one enemy by a number of marches, thus gaining time to beat and to pursue him, and then to turn against the other who is in the meantime merely watched. If this space, however, is narrowed down to the extent that you cannot attack one enemy without running the risk of meeting the other who attacks you from the flank or rear, then the strategic advantage of the inner line of operations turns into the tactical disadvantage of encirclement during the battle."

THIS statement deserves close examination. First, it indicates a belief that the inner line of operations constitutes a strategic advantage for the force employing them, but only when there is sufficient space to permit the defeat and pursuit of one enemy force without thereby creating the opportunity for another enemy force to attack the flank or rear. Secondly, it points out that if the space is insufficient and thereby permits an attack on the flanks or rear, the strategic advantage not only disappears, but is immediately replaced by the severe tactical disadvantage of encirclement.

This means that at some stage the force operating on interior lines is subject abruptly to transition from being at an advantage to being at a disadvantage.

The question becomes: what conditions effect this transition? The answer is: when the force employing interior lines cannot move to attack an enemy force without risking an attack on its flanks or rear by another enemy force.

The views of Jomini and Clausewitz on this question were conditioned by the speed of a man on foot or a horse. Moltke's included the speed of a railway. Likewise the observations of all three were conditioned to the limited artillery range of their day and the speed and destructive ability of nineteenth century cavalry. Air power was unknown; so was the land power moved by motor vehicles. So also were nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons. But these facts do not alter the essential validity of the views held by Clausewitz and Moltke.

RATHER, the effect of these new machines and weapons is the extreme shrinkage of time and space factors and an enormous increase in destructive power. In short, the interior position held by the Communist world has been transformed by our new weapons from one of strategic advantage of interior lines to a disadvantageous position of tactical encirclement.

While it is granted that the concept of an area roughly 6000 miles by 2000 miles being tactically encircled may be difficult to grasp, the essential factor is present for modern sea and air power.

The Communist world is open to tactical encirclement by an attack on its flank or rear.

ATTACK ALONG A RIDGELINE


THIS article is taken from one of the most important and valuable books the Combat Forces Press has ever published.

Combat Actions in Korea, a book that tells the details of twenty separate small-unit battles of infantry, artillery and armor outfits of the Eighth Army, is a worthy companion to *Infantry in Battle*, the most famous small-unit action book ever published.

Combat Actions in Korea was conceived by Major General Orlando Ward when he was Chief of the Office of Military History, Department of the Army. Many Army historians participated in the collection and writing of the book but the principal participant was Captain Russell A. Gugeler, Artillery.

Each chapter of the book is concluded with a discussion that analyzes the action, points out errors of omission and commission, and emphasizes the lessons that are in the action. The discussion that follows the chapter used here was written for the Office of Military History by Lieutenant Nicholas A. Canzona of the U.S. Marine Corps.

The announcement of the book's publication appears on the back cover of this issue.



CAPTAIN RUSSELL A. GUGELER

THE first break in the Naktong defense line at the central sector of the Pusan perimeter occurred during the early morning of 6 August 1950 when an estimated one thousand enemy troops crossed the Naktong River and penetrated the zone of the 34th Infantry, 24th Infantry Division. The regimental commander immediately committed his reserve and counterattacked, but the North Koreans clung to their bridgehead on the east side of the river. During the night the enemy moved sufficient forces across the Naktong to replace their losses and increase their strength. When the division commander, Maj. Gen. John H.

Church, learned that the enemy had crossed the last good natural barrier in southern Korea, he committed his reserve, the 19th Infantry, in an effort to drive the enemy back across the river. During the next few days General Church attacked with all the troops he could muster from his own understrength division and from units attached to it by Eighth Army. The North Koreans, however, continued to build up their forces east of the Naktong.

By 8 August, North Koreans, totaling a reinforced regiment, had waded the river and pulled raftsloads of heavy equipment, including trucks, across with



them. Two days later they appeared to have two regiments in strong positions east of the Nakdong. Consolidating all troops in the southern part of his division zone under the command of Col. John G. Hill, whose 9th Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry Division, was attached to the 24th Division to help restore the Nakdong line, General Church ordered a counterattack on 11 August. Task Force Hill's attack ran squarely into strong enemy attacks and the entire operation lost its direction and impetus in the resulting confusion. With communications lacking much of the time and enemy forces scattered throughout a large area, one regimental commander summed up the chaos by saying, "There are dozens of enemy and American forces all over the area, and they are all surrounding each other." During this period of grim combat, a desperate effort was made to prevent collapse of the Nakdong line, while North Koreans fought back with equal determination. Task Force Hill, now comprising three infantry regiments, launched a full-scale attack again

on 14 August. It failed once more.

General Church ordered the attack to continue at 0630, 15 August. It would commence on the left (south) flank of the task force zone where the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, was to lead off in a column of companies. The battalion commander chose Company A to lead the attack.

Eighth Army planned maximum artillery support and gave Task Force Hill priority on tactical airplanes. Early that morning, however, it began to rain, and thick clouds along the ridgelines interfered with effective operation of the planes.

SOON after first light on the morning of 15 August, the commander of Company A summoned the leader of the 1st Platoon, Lt. Melvin D. Schiller, to whom he briefly outlined the plan of attack. Lieutenant Schiller, whose platoon was to lead the company column, had time only to take his squad leaders to high ground where he could point out to them the objective and the general route to be followed. The 1st Battalion's objective was a ridgeline a mile and a half long and approximately four hundred

feet higher than the stream and the rice paddies at the ridge's base. There were several separate peaks along the crest of the ridgeline.

Followed by the rest of Company A, Lieutenant Schiller's platoon proceeded to the southeast end of the ridge, took up its attack formation, waited a few minutes until the end of a fifteen-minute artillery preparation, and then started up the ridge in a general northwest direction. Members of the platoon, knowing that the North Koreans had repulsed a similar attack that Company B had made two days before, expected trouble. For about a quarter of the distance, however, the platoon moved up the ridgeline without interference. Then two enemy machine guns, firing from the left, forced the platoon to the ground. When this happened, the company commander called Lt. Edward L. Shea and told him to take his 2d Platoon through the stalled unit and continue the advance. Lieutenant Shea and one of his squad leaders (SFC Roy E. Collins) exchanged dubious glances. Their platoon consisted of 9 inexperienced men and 24 replacements who had joined the company three days before.

Motioning his men to follow, Lieutenant Shea started up the ridge.



"Let's take a look at it," he said, as he strode off erectly. As he neared the 1st Platoon's position, enemy fire forced him to the ground. He crawled up beside Lieutenant Schiller who was lying on his stomach behind a native grave mound which was about four feet high, four feet in diameter, and covered with neatly trimmed grass. Lieutenant Schiller was trying to locate the two enemy machine guns that were holding up the advance. He and Lieutenant Shea suspected that the guns were located on the short hill on the left flank, since the string of enemy bullets seemed to cross just above the grave. Just as the two platoon leaders reached this conclusion, a bullet struck Schiller's helmet. It cut his head, followed the curve of his helmet, passed through his shoulder, and emerged to lodge in Shea's leg just above the knee. The two officers, both casualties, immediately directed their platoons to open fire against the enemy guns. Friendly fire caused the enemy guns to suspend fire, and the attack moved forward along

the ridge top with the company commander, Lt. Albert F. Alfonso, directing the platoons.

THE two platoons worked well together, one group moving forward while the other fired at the enemy positions. Moving steadily, Company A soon reached the first high peak at the southwestern end of the ridgeline. It was about 0830 when the company stopped to plan for the continuation of the attack. There were freshly dug holes, but no enemy in the area.

Beyond this point the narrow crest of the ridge dipped slightly before rising again at the next peak. Formed by a spur ridge, the next high point appeared to be a rocky cliff, about four hundred yards away, which lay athwart the long ridgeline and the direction of attack. Just in front of the point where the cliff joined the main ridgeline, there was a depression, or saddle. During the few minutes that the company spent preparing to continue the attack, several of the

men observed enemy soldiers moving near the saddle. On the previous day, members of Company A had seen an enemy machine gun firing from the top of the rocky cliff.

Lieutenant Alfonso pointed out the saddle in front of the rocky cliff and told MSgt. Willie C. Gibson (now leading the 2d Platoon) to secure it. Alfonso then lined up the 1st Platoon behind an embankment on the high ground and assigned it the mission of firing at any enemy interference, and especially to silence the enemy machine gun, if it fired. Under the protection of the 1st Platoon's base of fire, the 2d Platoon would dash along the 500-yard-long ridge. Once the 2d was in the saddle, the 3d Platoon would follow and reinforce it.

SERGEANT GIBSON lined up his four squads in the order they were to leave. He planned to follow the 2d Squad. He detailed Sergeant Collins at the end of the line to make certain that

every man in the platoon moved out. Cpl. Leo M. Brennen (a squad leader and veteran of the Pacific War who had joined the company three days before) straightened and partially pulled the pin on a grenade he carried.

"I'll be the first to go," Brennen said. "The rest of you guys follow me."

Brennen jumped over the embankment and started running toward the objective. Sergeant Collins checked his watch. It was 0845. Three other men followed Brennen at fifteen-yard intervals, all of them running just below the crest of the ridge since enemy guns fired from the opposite, or southwest, side of the ridge. Just after the fourth man left, the North Koreans fired several short bursts from the machine gun on the rock cliff, hitting two men from the 1st Platoon, one in the eye and the other in the neck. Both were killed at once.

"After that," one of the surviving men said, "it was just like jumping into ice water."

But the rest of the platoon followed, each man about ten or fifteen steps behind the man in front. No one was wounded until the next to the last man—Cpl. Joseph H. Simoneau—rose to go. A burst from the North Korean gun struck him in the leg and shoulder. He yelled, "I'm hit!" and fell back toward Sergeant Collins. Collins pulled him back, called the medics, and then, after notifying the leader of the 3d Platoon that he was the last man from the 2d, jumped over the protective hump of dirt and ran.

This had taken no longer than five minutes. Sergeant Collins had gone only a few steps when Corporal Brennen, the lead man, reached the end of the ridge. After running the entire distance, Brennen looked over the low, pinched ridge separating him from the enemy-occupied ground and saw three North Koreans sitting around their machine gun as if they were relaxing. The gun was about twenty yards in front of him. Brennen had one grenade ready to throw and he tossed it. As he did this, he noticed movement to his left and turned to see another enemy light machine gun and its crew nearer than the first. He fired one clip from his rifle at them at the same time the machine gun fired at him. Corporal Brennen hit both enemy soldiers manning the gun, and believed he killed them, but not until they had shot him through the leg. He slid down the hill a short distance to a protected area. A brief period of noisy, confused, and furious fighting followed.

As the members of the 2d Platoon


reached the saddle, they formed a firing line along their side of the little ridge. Lying close to the ground, they peered over the ridge frequently to observe and fire at the enemy, who was often only a few yards away. Three or four men who became casualties within a few minutes slid down the slope to join Corporal Brennen. There, Sergeant Gibson and a medic were now caring for the wounded.

Sergeant Collins, whom Lieutenant Shea had appointed second in command, reached the combat area a few minutes after the first burst of activity and took over the direction of the 2d Platoon. Like Corporal Brennen, Sergeant Collins carried a grenade with the cotter pin straightened and the ring over his index finger so that he could flip out the pin quickly. A few seconds after he reached the saddle there was a burst of fire from an enemy burp gun on the left flank. Collins ran back toward the bank on the left end of the firing line and looked over the ridge just as a North Korean rose to fire into the American line. Collins dropped his grenade on the enemy side of the hill and jumped to one side as a burst from the burp gun dug into the ground near him. His grenade-burst threw the burp gun into the air, and as Collins rose to look over the ridgeline again, another North Korean picked up the gun and tried to reload it. Sergeant Collins shot him with his rifle. At this moment SFC Regis J. Foley of the 3d Platoon came up to Collins.

ACCORDING to the plan, the 3d Platoon was to follow immediately after the 2d Platoon. Sergeant Foley, the first man behind Sergeant Collins, reached the saddle, but the next man mistakenly turned into another narrow area about two thirds of the way across. Consequently, the entire 3d Platoon was lost to the action since it came under such heavy enemy fire that it could move neither forward nor to the rear.

"Foley," said Sergeant Collins, "you watch this end and don't let them get up here."

Collins then started back along the line of riflemen where several gaps had occurred as men became casualties. Some men were already yelling that they were out of ammunition, even though each rifleman had carried two bandoleers and a full belt of M1 clips—a total of 176 rounds. Sergeant Collins knew they would need help to win the battle they had started. Unaware that the 3d Platoon had gone to the wrong area and was now pinned down by heavy enemy fire, and believing that it would soon join him, Collins sent a runner to the company commander asking for more help and for more ammunition. He especially wanted grenades, which were easy to toss over the ridgeline. While he waited for word from the company commander, he went along the line, taking ammunition from those who were wounded or dead and distributing it to the men who were effective. By this time most of the men



in the platoons were calling for help, wanting either ammunition or medics. In addition to the close-in fighting that continued, the enemy machine gun up on the rocky cliff had turned and was firing at the exposed rear of the 2d Platoon. Fire from this gun varied according to the amount of fire that the 1st Platoon's base of fire delivered against it. When the covering fire was heavy, the enemy gun was quiet; but it resumed firing when the 1st Platoon quit.

IT took Sergeant Collins's runner eight minutes to make his round trip. He returned with a note from Lieutenant Alfonso which read, "Pull out."

At the far right of the line, Cpl. Joseph J. Sady yelled for a grenade. "They're pulling up a machine gun here," he shouted.

Collins threw Lieutenant Alfonso's note down and took a grenade to Corporal Sady who tossed it over on the enemy gunners.

"That took care of them," he said.

An enemy rifleman, firing from a distance of ten steps, hit Corporal Sady in the head and killed him. The next man in the line killed the North Korean.

Sergeant Collins worked back along the line. At the left end Sergeant Foley, who had been stationed there to hold that flank, came sliding down the ridge bareheaded and bleeding. He had been hit by a split bullet that had apparently ricocheted from a rock and had cut into his head. Collins bandaged him and told him to go back and ask the company commander for more help. But as soon as he was gone, Sergeant Collins realized that because his ammunition was so low,

and because less than half of his original strength remained, he had no alternative but to break contact and withdraw. He called down to tell Sergeant Gibson to start getting the wounded men out. Six men were wounded, two of them seriously, and Gibson started to evacuate them by moving them down a gully between the two hills to a road at the bottom.

NEAR the center of the saddle a Negro rifleman, PFC Edward O. Cleaborn, concentrated on keeping an enemy machine gun out of action. Standing up on the ridgeline and shooting down into the enemy side of the hill, he kept killing North Koreans who tried to man the gun. He was excited and kept firing rapidly, calling for ammunition and yelling, "Come on up, you sons of bitches,

DISCUSSION Lieutenant Nicholas A. Canzona

WHILE the American soldier is typified by courage, he is, at the same time, universally marked as an impulsive, intelligent individualist. Thus it is that strong leadership and guidance are necessary to weld a group of American soldiers into a singular unit of specific purpose. Without this directing strength at command level, each in the group will nobly carry on in his own merry way; and though the individual conduct of each might be highly commendable, the unit's mission can end in complete failure.

This fact is the underlying cause for the failure of Company A, 34th Infantry, in its attack on 15 August 1950.

If the aggressiveness and heroism of Brennen, Collins, Cleaborn, Sady, and others had been organized into a single, vigorous effort against the enemy, the objective would have been secured. Instead, each of these able fighters carried on his own private war, while the acting leader of the 2d Platoon was caring for wounded, and the company commander was entrenched with a base of fire five hundred yards away.

Correct and successful command at the platoon and company levels is not conducive to long life, because the commander must constantly expose himself in order to lead and maintain control. The commanding officer of Company A was conspicuously absent in action and decision from the time that he failed to join the 1st Platoon when it was first hit by long-range fire, until the very

end of the engagement when the survivors of the 2d Platoon withdrew from the bloody threshold of victory.

IT was unfortunate that the leading platoons lost their brave but reckless lieutenants when the battle had hardly begun. Had the leader of the 1st Platoon considered the enemy's point of view for only a moment, he would have realized that a conspicuous grave mound would be top priority for a machine gunner firing from a distance of several hundred yards. Taking extreme ranges into consideration, it is highly possible that the North Korean gunner did not even see the lieutenant, but was merely firing at a likely target. The 2d Platoon leader committed a grave error and set a poor example by joining the other officer within the narrow confines of the tempting target. What more bitter lesson against bunching up could be learned than to have two unit commanders become casualties as a result of one bullet? This disaster was an appropriate climax to the scene which just previously found the 2d Platoon leader walking erect along the crest of a hill that was under fire.

A study of the terrain would indicate that the company commander could have moved his entire unit into position on the high ground of the larger hill. Had he taken advantage of the natural cover afforded by the ridgeline, his company might have accomplished this movement without sustaining a casualty.

Then, with the company organized in the area which was used for the base of fire, the commander could have devised any number of plans involving maneuver, supporting arms, and assault for seizing the remainder of his objective.

But he first set a bad precedent when he allowed the 1st Platoon to halt as it came under long-range machine-gun fire. Instead of directing that unit to continue the attack, he impulsively pushed the 2d Platoon into the lead. It is noteworthy here that another platoon became lost and immobilized later, during the crucial stage of the battle.

The company commander should have been the key figure in the final phase of the attack; he should have been the spirit of a two-platoon assault which never materialized. Instead, remaining five hundred yards behind with the base of fire, he was so unable to control the two leading platoons that one of them even became lost and completely ineffective.

Judging from the fact that the 2d Platoon fought a large number of the enemy at a distance of only a few yards, it is evident that the Americans were practically in the heart of the North Korean position when they came to a halt. Then, for several minutes, bravery and sacrifice—which could have won the day—went for naught; and a great number of casualties was sustained without a decision being forced.

Had the company commander fol-

and fight!"

Sergeant Collins told him to get down on the ground, but Cleaborn said, "Sergeant, I just can't see them when I get down."

About this time an enemy soldier jumped over the little ridge and landed on top of Sergeant Collins who was stripping ammunition from one of his men who had just been killed. The North Korean grabbed Sergeant Collins by the waist and held on tightly. Seeing this, Cleaborn jumped down and started after the North Korean who kept hiding behind Sergeant Collins. Collins eventually persuaded Cleaborn that the enemy soldier wanted to surrender, and Cleaborn went back to the firing line. Collins pushed his prisoner down to the ditch where Gibson was evacuating the wounded. Sergeant Gibson loaded the

prisoner with the largest wounded man who had to be carried out, and started him down the gully toward the road.

BY the time Sergeant Foley returned with a renewal of the company commander's instructions to withdraw, the evacuation of all wounded men was under way. As men left the firing line, they helped the wounded. Only six men remained in firing positions and several of these were so low on ammunition they had fixed their bayonets. Sergeant Collins told the six to fire a heavy blast at the enemy's position, and then move out quickly. All but Cleaborn fired a clip of ammunition and then started to leave. He reloaded his rifle and said he wanted to fire one more clip. As he jumped back on the ridge to fire again, he was killed by a bullet through his head. Sergeant

Collins and the remaining five men ran back along the ridgeline, the route of their advance.

It was 0932 when the men reached the little spur from which the 1st Platoon had been firing, just forty-seven minutes after the attack had begun. Of the original 36 men in the 2d Platoon that morning, only 10 were unharmed. Nine wounded men walked or were carried down the ditch to the road, three dying before reaching the road. The other members of the platoon were dead.

The 1st Battalion's attack had been stopped. Other elements of Task Force Hill encountered similarly stubborn resistance, and during the afternoon the commander of the force recommended to General Church that the attack be discontinued and that the force dig in to defend the ground it occupied.

lowed the 2d Platoon, he could have spurred it into an assault. With men like Cleaborn and Collins setting the pace, the North Korean soldiers probably would have reeled back and retreated or surrendered. Moreover, it is probable that the 3d Platoon would not have strayed into temporary oblivion had it been following on the heels of a watchful company commander. Even after this unit had wandered into the draw, it certainly could have been retrieved under sufficient prodding. Could it have fared any worse than to lie exposed and immobile under the barrels of two enemy automatic weapons? Hardly!

Although the enemy force could have been eliminated by a combination of aggressive leadership and small-arms fire, the apparent lack of artillery support during this attack is enough to shake the foundations of The Artillery School at Fort Sill. In the introduction to the battle account, there is mention of the fact that Eighth Army planned "full artillery support." Where was it? Why was it not employed when a relatively small group of enemy on a prominent terrain feature held up a battalion attack? If the enemy's guns were periodically silenced by sporadic bursts from Company A's base of fire, surely white phosphorus and high-explosive shells would have wrought havoc with such cautious defenders.

ONCE again the big gap between tactical theory and practice is glaringly exposed by the bland statement: "After an artillery preparation, the attack

moved off about 0700." Company A then had to proceed a mere one and one-half miles, while unmolested enemy gunners lolled pleasantly in their holes and fingered their triggers expectantly.

When once the area occupied by the enemy was known, not only artillery, but also mortars and recoilless rifles could have rained a devastating barrage of steel and fire into the hostile position.

The layout of the terrain and the location of the enemy's defenses were ideal for maximum fire support throughout all but the assault phase of the attack. Shielded with covering fire, Company A could have retained excellent control to a point from which the final, victorious assault could have been launched.

Another deadly, disquieting annoyance for the North Koreans might have been in the form of flanking and frontal machine-gun and rocket-launcher fire delivered from the center and northwest portions of the larger hill. Such weapons would have been able to give added protection to the 2d and 3d Platoons until they were in position to assault.

Why small-unit commanders overlook the lifesaving potential of supporting arms, and why higher commanders tolerate that oversight, are questions which cry futilely for logical answers.

IN general, nothing but the highest praise is sufficient for the individual conduct of the soldiers of Company A throughout this action. Although their lieutenants were wounded early, leav-

ing them nothing in the way of leadership except long-range encouragement from their company commander, they closed with the enemy, clung tenaciously to a position of bitter attrition, and inflicted many casualties on a foe who was flushed with victory and confidence. When ordered to withdraw, they did so in an orderly fashion, ensuring that wounded comrades among them were first removed to safety. Even in this last, most distasteful of all military maneuvers, they acquitted themselves with honor, despite the fact that they had no really effective covering fire.

It was indeed fortunate for the men of the 2d Platoon that the flame of natural leadership in Sergeant Collins burned brightly during this engagement. Had it not been for his initiative and exemplary action, the plight of the platoon might have ended as complete catastrophe.

Noble as his sentiments might have been, the NCO acting as 2d Platoon leader picked a poor time to work as a medic. While his command was being decimated, he should have played a role far more active than that of comforter to the afflicted.

That Cleaborn and others were probably carried away by temporary fanaticism—to the point of paying for it with their lives—is certainly not to the discredit of these men. Had an experienced commander been present to maintain control and demand discipline, it is very possible that these soldiers might still be alive. Or, at least, they would have had a victory in return for their supreme sacrifice.

The Month's Reading

Press On with the Beer

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL
(Personal Minutes, June-December 1944)
Triumph and Tragedy
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953

PRIME MINISTER TO SECRETARY FOR WAR 20 Nov. 44

Good. Press on. Make sure that the beer—four pints a week—goes to the troops under the fire of the enemy before any of the parties in the rear get a drop.

The Way It Is

LIEUTENANT GENERAL DONALD L. PUTT
Commander, Air Research & Development Command
Speech, Harrisburg, Pa.
10 March 1954

During the recent "March of Dimes" campaign the Air Research and Development Command collected a sizeable contribution by staging a basketball game between a team of colonels and a team of master sergeants. Some people appeared surprised when the colonels won, but not so a grizzled old master sergeant. Turning to one of his men he was overheard to growl: "No wonder those youngsters won. After all, in this man's Air Force it takes less time to become a colonel than a master sergeant!"

What Is the General Staff?

LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALTER L. WEIBLE
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations & Administration
Speech, Washington, D. C.
25 March 1954

In the minds of some Americans, the term "General Staff" has taken on sinister connotations—not because of what it is but because of the way some other countries, most notably Germany, have abused it. . . .

The General Staff of the United States Army is nothing more, actually, than an administrative system, corresponding to the administrative systems which are widely employed in industry. In its General Staff, the United States Army has agencies to coordinate all planning and activity in the major fields of Army responsibility. These fields of activity are classified as personnel matters; intelligence matters; planning, training, and operations matters; and logistics matters. This system exists at all echelons down to include divisions. Thus, just as a corporation has its Vice President in charge of personnel, the Army has its G1. A corporation has a Vice President in charge of production, the Army has its G3 and G4. In sum, the General Staff is the special instrument of the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff for the coordination of activities of the various specialized agencies of the Army. . . .

One misunderstanding which has prevailed widely is that our General Staff, like the old Prussian General Staff, is a career field. Apparently there are those who think that there is a body of officers specializing exclusively in General

Staff duty, in contrast to the "line," which is made up of the personnel who serve with troop units. A further misconception is that there exists antagonism between line and staff. Both these beliefs are completely erroneous.

In the United States Army, staff duty—including General Staff duty—is merely one of the many types of assignments which every officer can expect to perform at one time or another during his military service. It is not a career field in itself. . . .

Engineered 'Scorched Earth'

MAJOR GENERAL G. N. TUCK
The Royal Engineers Journal
March 1954

Sad as it may be for the ally who is closest to the aggressor, the hard fact must be accepted that against modern weapons it may not be possible to halt the superior air and ground forces of an aggressor at the frontier. Of course an aggressor can be hit at long range, but his momentum will carry him so far. In this event, while offering tenacious resistance, it would be possible to create in the path of the enemy a transportation desert in order to slow his advance. The Germans did this effectively in their 1917 strategic withdrawal, but of course they had time to do a methodical and painstakingly thorough job. Even in limited time, and in face of rapid advance, it is suggested that engineers to-day, 35 years later, equipped with modern machines and power, could rip the bottom out of every airfield, road, railway, bridge and bridle path, and sow mines in the resulting debris. The enemy cannot fight without forward airfields or without means of transport for fuel and ammunition. Certainly hardy troops could live on the country for a while, but even Napoleon's Revolutionaries were halted by the desolation east of the lines of Torres Vedras. Behind such a belt of scorched earth the defending tactical air forces should be able to regain air superiority, and the land forces should have time to reinforce and to organize offensive counterthrusts.

PIO Is a Reporter

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Office of Information
U.S. Navy Public Relations Newsletter
5 March 1954

A Navy captain with an excellent operational reputation and an engaging personality remarked: "The Navy's best public relations is simply to do a top-notch job. We don't have to go around bragging about it—the American people will know it!" While we're willing to credit the American people with innumerable capabilities, mental telepathy isn't one of them. They do have a thoroughly human curiosity about just how the Navy is using their money and we have a definite responsibility to let them know.

. . . Just as a commander has an administrative section

charged with seeing that the necessary reports go in to his seniors in the chain of command, in the same manner he has a public information section to make sure continuous reports are put out to the very top echelon of command—the American people.

Some naval officers still confuse public information with propaganda. The right outlook should be the same one taken in getting up a report to a senior. Make it factual and to the point. If you try to color it or distort it to make you look better, you're in for a rough time when the truth comes out—which it will.

* * *

If you fail to keep the public informed, you can hardly blame them for feeling you can't be doing so well—otherwise what are you trying to hide? If their doubts grow too big, we soon wouldn't have a Navy suitable for the tremendous job that must be done in any future war. If we don't have a suitable Navy, we wouldn't have a Nation for long. It's as simple as that.

After the Bombers Pass

MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM F. DEAN
The Saturday Evening Post
27 February 1954

On June sixteenth, we moved south again—for once, traveling in daylight. I had a chance to see fields planted where cities had been, bomb-resistant villages hastily built in canyons, and the railroad lined at every stream with whole bridge sections ready to be shoved in place if existing bridges were bombed. I think no major bridge had escaped bombing. But I was ready to believe the North Koreans who claimed that they could have trains running within hours after any new bombing. I also saw elaborate truck hide-outs in canyons. The few houses still standing in the villages were empty of people, but crammed with boxes and sacks of military supplies. Roads had traffic-control points, complete with lookouts and flagmen, every two kilometers.

Radar Defense of U.S.

SIR ROBERT WATSON-WATT
Foreign Affairs
January 1954

(Sir Robert was a pioneer in radar development, especially in originating and perfecting the radio-location system.)

May I now, in conclusion, interview myself briefly?

Question 1: "Can a radar network be designed, on the knowledge available to us within 1953, to give certain warning at a defense command center of the passage of any aircraft over a frontier lying outward, by about six hours flying time, from any major target of attack in the continental United States?"

Answer 1: "My personal answer is broadly 'yes,' but it is subject to many reservations and explanatory supplements which cannot be set out within the limits of an article."

Question 2: "Can an aircraft crossing this frontier be identified within 15 minutes to the degree of being classed as 'very probably hostile' or 'very probably friendly'?"

Answer 2: "I do not think that an adequate or nearly adequate solution to this problem has yet been found."

Question 3: "Can the early-warning network envisaged in Questions 1 and 2 ensure the destruction of an overwhelmingly large fraction of a hostile force before it reaches a major target?"

Answer 3: "Not without the absolutely indispensable activities of an inner radar network for control of interception, and of a very large, exquisitely organized and stringently practised interceptor force."

Question 4: "Can such a destruction ratio as is envisaged in Question 3 be achieved without the network of Question 1 and the organization envisaged in Answer 3?"

Answer 4: "Quite certainly not without the latter, almost certainly not without both; almost certainly 'yes' if both are well designed and well operated."

Question 5: "Are these two radar networks and the elaborate interceptor organization indispensable to the defense of the United States, having regard to other military deterrents to aggression against the United States?"

Answer 5: "Yes."

Question 6: "Do you think the United States economy can afford the provision and operation of this threefold defense system, together with the other deterrents mentioned in Answer 5?"

Answer 6: "Yes. Expensive as they are, they are certainly within the reasonable reach of an economy with a present Gross National Product valued at a billion dollars a day. A just appreciable reduction of the material standard of living in the United States would probably be involved; but it would not be more than a minute fraction of the hardships still being suffered by every nation outside North America on both sides of the Iron Curtain. This I say not from secondhand information only, but from personal observation, in and since World War II, in every continent save Australasia and on both sides of the Iron Curtain."

Question 7: "Have you anything more to say on aids to averting successful aggression against North America?"

Answer 7: "Yes, two widely different things. First, that we must not underestimate the risk that isolated defense airfields, in the Far North for example, could become intermediate airfields used by the aggressor. Second, that as words are still triggers that release bombs, we should be diligent to use no word that tends, avoidably, to unite the ordinary citizens of Soviet and satellite lands with their dictatorial masters."

Investment in the Army

WALTER LIPPMANN
The Washington Post and Times-Herald
25 March 1954

The American people have gotten to know the Army well because so many millions of them have been in the Army. They do not exactly think the Army is perfect, nor do they love it without reservation. Yet there is scarcely a family in the country which does not have invested in the Army something personal and poignant. Just about the last thing they would think of complaining about is that this Army, which has just fought a murderous war against armed Communists, and not merely against fifth amendment dentists, is coddling Communists.



Off-duty life on Okinawa can be as pleasant as life along the Florida Panhandle whose climate it resembles.

OKINAWA

Life on the 'rope in the sea'

MAJOR MARCO POLO

THERE was a time, not long ago, when assignment to Okinawa was like being sent to the ends of the earth. But times have changed, and so has the Ryukyus Command. Today Okinawa is a fine place to be stationed if you don't suffer from the geographic claustrophobia some people get on islands.

"Oki," as those who have lived there usually refer to it, is a narrow matchstick sticking out of the sea between Japan and Formosa. The island is 67 miles long and from three to 10 miles wide. The southern half of the island is rolling, and has most of Okinawa's towns, farms, roads and people. Northern Okinawa is mountainous, sparsely populated, and practically inaccessible except for practicing infantrymen and other rugged walkers.

The island is one of the United States' important outposts on the edges of the Asian mainland. The Ryukyu Islands group is a series of islands lying like a

AROUND THE BASES—5

string of beads (Okinawa means "rope in the sea") running between Japan and Formosa. Okinawa itself is about 440 nautical miles from Shanghai, 400 from Formosa, 840 from Tokyo and 6,000 from San Francisco. The island group sneaks up to within sight of the southernmost Japanese island, but few of the Ryukyus are inhabited. Okinawa proper is the only one upon which American troops are stationed.

The people are Asiatic, primarily of Japanese descent but darker and stockier than most Japanese. The language of Okinawa is Japanese, although the culture is a mixture of Japanese and Chinese, with a sprinkling of local art and customs. They are a rugged people who live close to the land and the sea.

Most American troops on the island

are Air Force, since Okinawa is an important air base. Bombers from the island flew combat missions over Korea all through the fighting there. The Army, however, maintains a regimental combat team, a number of technical and support units, and a military government detachment.

Normal tour of duty on Okinawa is 15 months these days, but if dependents go, their sponsor must stay at least a year after his family joins him. Since there is a three-month wait for dependents now (it has been as high as 18 months) you can expect to stay on Oki about a year and a half.

The journey out is normally by boat. Both you and your dependents will probably leave from San Francisco, and you can expect the trip to take from 20 to 25 days. Air travel to the island is rare, although some families are now returning to the States by plane. Concurrent travel to the island is not authorized.

Living is comfortable. There was a time when quarters were none too good. A one-time deputy commander reported he liked it fine except that his house, like most other military quarters on the island, had a tin roof, and it was directly in line with the foot of a bomber runway. Every time one of the big planes took off he had a sensation that must be similar to that of a mouse in a bass fiddle. New housing has been built fast the past couple of years, and now you will find family quarters in solid, comfortable concrete houses with asphalt tile floors. Closets are big, there are airy porches, and the houses are typhoon proof. This last is important on an island that experiences one or two typhoons a year; gales are so violent that they actually have blown the paint off an automobile.

FURNISHINGS in family quarters are good, but prospects for the future aren't bright. This disappointing lag in progress is simply because we are no longer on an Occupation status. As trustees for the United Nations we are building a local administration (the islands themselves still belong to Japan). Result, as far as living conditions are concerned, is that furniture that was once manufactured by the island as part of occupation payments is no longer available. Small items like end tables, lamps, and other furnishings not normally considered Quartermaster issue will be issued only until stocks are depleted.

So you will be smart to take lamps with you, as well as the other bric-a-brac and small items of furniture you feel you will need to make living more comfortable. Rugs are not an item of issue and it is not wise to bring yours along as they may be susceptible to mildew. Grass and fiber rugs are on sale for low prices on the local market and most people have found them highly satisfactory.

Take your electrical appliances with you. They will all work without adjustment since power on Okinawa is the same 110 volt, 60 cycle current you have in the States. Your normal Stateside radio will bring in the 17-hour a day broadcasting schedule of the Armed Forces Radio Service stations, but many people like to have a short wave set that will pick up stations in the United States, the Philippines and Japan. There is no television on Okinawa, and it does not appear likely that there will be a video station for a long time. There does not seem much chance that AFRS will go into video any time soon.

You will want a washing machine, since the Okinawan climate will keep

your clothes hamper full. It had best be a non-automatic type, because the supply of spare parts for the automatic models is not satisfactory.

Bring your pots and pans and kitchen utensils. However, a cautionary note is in order: Okinawa is a hot and humid land and the air is salty, and rust is a common household nuisance. For that reason aluminum, copper and/or stainless steel equipment is more satisfactory than iron or tin.

The same consideration is important in selecting the furniture you will take with you. You can get along on what the Quartermaster will furnish, and you might be wise to do it. In any event firmly resist any impulse to tote along your overstuffed pieces, good leather-topped tables or desks—anything that can't endure dampness and mold.

The exception is beds. Take your own, because QM mattresses are . . . you supply the description from your own experience.

Include in your household goods a few simple tools—hammer, saw, screwdrivers and so on—and a collection of nails, screws, nuts and bolts, and other small hardware. Such items, hard to come by on Okinawa, are necessary to the maintenance of your quarters.

Shopping facilities on the island are generally good, but there are a few items you will want to stock up on before you leave the States. Take plenty of shoes, and a good supply of "findings" if the love-light of your life has a hankering to be a seamstress.

OKINAWA is a coral island, and the rocks are hard on shoes. Also, you will walk a lot because much of the recreation is outdoors on the beaches, the golf course, or picnicking. The climate is good, and will keep you outside. The weather is about like northern Florida's, with summer's high temperatures seldom getting above 90 and winter days almost never dropping below 45. Highest temperature ever recorded was 96, and the lowest 41. The year-round average is 72. Humidity is high, staying largely in the 90s during the summer.

Temperature and humidity make clothing hard to care for, and have made Okinawa a pretty casual station as far as dress is concerned. On duty, soldiers wear summer cottons except from 1 January to 14 March. Civilian clothes are authorized off duty. The ladies find that cottons and a couple of light suits will carry them for daytime wear. They will need a couple of formals, but they should be simple, cool, and easy to care for. They go months without wearing

a hat on Okinawa, but rain and wind make the ubiquitous scarf one of Oki's most popular items of wearing apparel.

"Washable" is the keynote for Okinawan clothing. Dry cleaners on the island are not equipped to handle delicate materials.

YOU will find shopping facilities spotty. The commissaries are good, carrying a full line of canned goods, frozen fruits and vegetables, and an excellent supply of meat. There is a full supply of milk from the reconstitution plant on the island. There are some fresh vegetables available through the commissaries, which are locally produced on farms inspected and approved by the Army. All in all, the food supply for the military families on Okinawa is as good as in most outlying areas of the world.

Actually fresh vegetables are in short supply at times and some military families have found gardening helps supplement the deficiency. If you are interested you would be wise to stock up on seeds, both vegetable and flower, before you leave the States. The soil is fertile and gardening can be fun. However, if you aren't the "green thumb" type you can hire a native gardener for \$12 a month, maybe less. Household help is cheap in Okinawa and \$12 is about the top wage paid or asked.

The Post Exchanges are like PXs everywhere. They have a good supply of tobacco and toilet articles and other odds and ends. But don't plan to dress yourself or your children from their counters. Children's clothes, shoes, underthings, women's clothes, hose, cosmetics, are all in short supply and all (the clothes, that is) look pretty much alike. Items of uniform and some sports clothes are available in the PXs.

The ladies will want to stock up on cotton underthings (the humidity makes nylon clammy and uncomfortable) and on those little boot-socks called "peds" before leaving the States. What is true of nylon slips is also true of stockings. Hose are seldom worn in the daytime.

As I have said before in this series, it is wise to leave a file of sizes and color and style preferences with the personal shopper in your favorite United States department store before going to Okinawa. You will make good use of such a service. And take a mail order catalogue or two; it takes six weeks to two months to get mail order delivery on the island, but it will be worth it for such things as children's shoes and toys, and some sporting equipment.

You will find yourself doing a lot of shopping by mail. Since the States are



Picnics are popular and some Okinawa scenery is ruggedly impressive. You can wear mufti off duty.

so far away, the mail order facilities of Japan and Hong Kong will tempt you, and you should try them. For men, Hong Kong has several excellent tailors who will provide good suits quickly and far cheaper than you could get at home.

Outside of the military facilities such as the PX and commissary, stores on Okinawa will meet some of your needs nicely, others not at all. There are a few large department stores there, that handle many things of interest to the service family. The women will be fascinated by the yard goods, imported from Japan, the Philippines and Hong Kong. Material, weave, finish and price are all attractive, but here is where they will need the findings they brought from home, because such things as thread, buttons and binding tape are scarce on Okinawa.

Also available on the local market are jewelry (they cultivate pearls on Okinawa; some of them are black and extraordinarily handsome), some works of art, small items of furniture, grass rugs, and china. Glasses, however, are hard to come by and it is wise to leave home with a good stock of the dime-store variety for family use.

THERE are automobile agencies on the island, too. You can buy a Ford or General Motors car for just about what it would cost you in California (without California's personal property tax) except for an added \$300 or so shipping charge. You can escape this freight cost if you go to Okinawa without an automobile, buy one there for delivery to the U.S. port, and have it shipped on your travel orders. This is a good plan if you need a new car except that it takes time, and, despite the island's smallness, you will find an automobile an awfully handy thing on Oki.

With several automobile agencies on

the island, there is very little service problem. However, the climate is hard on cars, so yours should be in good shape before you leave the States; and have it undercoated and put on a coat of some long-lasting finish protector to guard the paint and chrome from the salt air, which raises hob with paint jobs and unprotected metal. The only special regulation you will meet with your car on Okinawa is a \$1.00 annual licensing fee.

Since most of the recreation is outdoors, and since the weather is as good as it is, you will find your car in steady use going to the beaches, golf courses, tennis courts, picnics, or just sight seeing.

In addition to the usual outdoor sports, Okinawa offers three spectator sports not common in the United States. Cockfighting, a favorite Okinawan game both for the sport and the gambling it provides, is a national pastime. Every village has its bird pit, and the fights draw big crowds. There is bullfighting too, of a kind almost unknown anywhere else in the world. Instead of pitting bull against man, as in Spain and Mexico, the Okinawans pit bull against bull. The huge animals are carefully bred and trained, and the fights are a riot of action. Trainers work in the fighting rings with their animals, urging them on with word and rope, and there is strong partisanship in the crowd. Bulls seldom are killed in these fights, but it is far from gentle.

A THIRD Okinawan fighting sport is the battle between mongoose and snake. Most Americans have never seen a mongoose, but the scrappy little animals are common on Oki. The natives not only use them to hunt snakes, but pit them against the poisonous "Habu" snake in public fights.

Also for recreation there are hunting

and fishing. Most people turn to deep sea fishing, although there is some reasonably good fresh water fishing on the island. As for hunting, there are ducks and doves and some tiny quail, and there are rumors that there are boar in the northern mountains. Soldiers frequently make up hunting parties to go after the wild pigs, but seldom if ever bag one.

If you are one of those who dislike to have your recreation and exercise go hand in hand, the island has an excellent network of service clubs and hobby shops, and the officers' clubs sponsor a formal dance every now and then.

The schools on Okinawa are very good. Operated by the military, they provide kindergarten and grades from first through 12th year. School buses carry the students back and forth, and lunches are available at school at small cost.

Since the war the Okinawans have developed a sincere interest in education, and there is a university on the island now, but college level study for dependents of military personnel is not available on the island.

SOUTH of Naha, Okinawa's principal city, is "Suicide Cliff," where hundreds of Japanese soldiers killed themselves in the summer of 1945 rather than surrender to United States troops. The island was die-hard enemy territory. Today nearly 60,000 Okinawans work for the United States military forces, diligently and with often-demonstrated loyalty. These people, as well as their island, are turning into an important outpost in the struggle for human freedom, and the American serving on Oki advances that struggle both by what he does on the job and what he does in his dealing with the island's people. It is an interesting and heartening assignment.

MANPOWER



The hazards of combat impose physical and mental limits on the fighting man.



MAJOR IRVIN M. KENT, Judge Advocate General's Corps, was a platoon leader and company commander in the 60th Infantry, 9th Division, during the 1944-45 campaigns in Europe. He entered the Army in 1942 from Syracuse University where he had earned a commission in the ORC. He left the service in 1946 to attend Harvard Law School. After graduation, he served as a government attorney in Nuremberg and reentered the service in 1948 while still in Germany. He successfully completed a competitive tour for a regular commission in the JAGC and is now on duty in Washington.

WHERE CAN WE GET THE FIGHTING MEN?

MAJOR IRVIN M. KENT

WORLD WAR II and Korea have taught us that there is a maximum time limit to the physical and mental hazards imposed on the combat soldier and after that limit is reached his performance in battle doesn't even measure up to the minimum standards of fighting efficiency.

This raises a question: Where are the replacements to come from so that the Army can relieve the soldier when his usefulness in combat is ended?

The answer, it seems to me, must be: In case of a general war every mentally and physically qualified man must expect to do his fair share of combat duty. This regardless of the service—Army, Air Force, or Navy—that he joins.

The Army alone cannot supply the answer. As we found out in 1944-45, it is going to be necessary to put men who were initially in the air and service forces into the lines as infantrymen. This is not something to be deplored but to be expected and therefore planned. By the very nature of war some branches of the military and naval services have more men (actually and percentagewise) who do not directly see combat or even combat type conditions than others. Such services get a larger number of volunteers who thus successfully avoid combat dangers and hardships. To permit a physically and mentally fit man to be almost assured of avoiding combat by volunteering for a particular service is a national failure to assure best use of available combat qualified manpower. It also imposes an unfair burden on too small a percentage of men and unnecessarily reduces the efficiency of our ground force combat units.

To overcome this handicap we must now, before general mobilization begins, make certain interservice regulations and agreements as to the mutual transfer of manpower (perhaps on a loan basis), without depriving the career soldier, sailor or airman of his long-run promotion and retirement rights and benefits.

TO start with first things first, if we are not to waste combat qualified manpower we must see that combat qualified

men are not assigned to jobs which command less than their full capabilities unless the man has already served his combat tour. Before going further, it is necessary to define the term "combat qualified." Combat qualified, in my opinion, means that combination of physical and mental ability to meet and withstand the rigors of the modern battlefield for an extended period of time. It cannot mean merely physical stamina alone, nor merely nervous stability alone. Many men physically fit for front-line duty are incapable of maintaining nervous stability under the pressures of modern combat for more than very short periods of time. Likewise, many men with perfect nervous stability, who would be able to go for months in combat without breaking mentally, are physically incapable of enduring the bodily hardships that go with combat.

It is equally necessary for us to define the term "job capability." Thus, when

One aid to classification. With rare exceptions every man physically able to fight should be trained as a fighter no matter what other potential skills he may possess.





The cook in a rifle company must come closer to the physical standards of a rifleman than the cook back at ComZ or ZI, so also with clerks and drivers.

we say that a man may not hold a job below his capabilities, we must think not merely in terms of physical or mental capabilities alone, but of the sum total, and while doing so we must keep in mind that there are and will be rare specialties, where men with special abilities would be more useful to the nation in a non-combat assignment than they would be in a combat assignment, regardless of how well they are otherwise qualified for such combat assignment. For example, men with very rare language capabilities might be needed for liaison or intelligence work in areas that may be far removed from active theaters of operation. Highly skilled cryptographers may well fall into the same category. However, such skilled persons would probably never total more than one or two percent of our service manpower, if indeed the figure would be that high.

Thus, each job within the Department of Defense must have not one but two

physical profiles applicable to it: a minimum and a maximum. *The only acceptable excuse for a man holding a job below his own capabilities in time of general war should be either that he has already served his combat time and has been rotated out of combat, or that he has completed combat training, but has not yet been called into the replacement stream.* Naturally, every rule has its exceptions and the exception to this rule is that of a man possessing rare skills.

THIS establishment of job profiles must be far more complete than anything we have in the past attempted and it must go into every field and every branch. Merely to set minimum and maximum standards for infantry, artillery, quartermaster, and such is futile and wasteful. For example, the company clerk of a rifle company of a combat organization does not need to have the same physical qualifications as the rifleman of the same company. The fact that

he may see combat for a comparatively short period of time in an emergency is no excuse for the wastage of a fully fit man by such an assignment.

On the other hand, the physical requirements for his job must be higher than for the company clerk of a rifle training company in a ComZ or ZI replacement training center, or for the equivalent job at an air, service, or naval base. With the possible exception of an advanced fighter base, the conditions of life at such an installation do not require very high physical standards. Actually, for such a job at a ZI installation most of the men we now classify as IV-F are physically fit. Men who have inferior eyesight, no teeth, broken eardrums, or even lack one leg could clerk in a ZI installation. It is a matter of readjusting our mental attitudes. The idea that every man in uniform has to be able to make the obstacle course is a luxury in which we cannot indulge in a war against powers that have far greater resources of manpower than we have.

AMONG other good examples (which in the aggregate total a vast amount of manpower) are cooks, medics, finance men, truck drivers, and military police. Look closely at the demands made on these men. In each case keep before you a mental picture of the combat rifleman who should stand at the apex of our pyramid of capabilities. In each case compare the demands of the individual position against the standard of the rifleman.

Take the first cook of a rifle company. He must, I think we will all agree, be almost up to the rifleman standard but even here there are some exceptions. For one thing, the ability to make long marches is not an absolute prerequisite. He must, however, have considerable physical stamina and be able to take exposure and hardship for long periods. Therefore he should be comparatively young and vigorous, and capable, if need be, of engaging with the enemy at close range at least for limited periods of time. Therefore the maximum and minimum profiles for this job will be quite close to those of the rifleman.

Now the cook back at the division headquarters company obviously does not require as high a standard of physical toughness. But he must have enough stamina and ruggedness to carry his share of the load of work and take part in the defense and security of the division CP. But as soon as we get to the rear of division or the corps headquarters, our standards for cooks must take

sharp drops. Men in the ComZ need not be able to sleep on the ground for weeks without having rheumatism catch up with them, because they won't have to. At that stage they will have beds or cots and some degree of shelter more comfortable than a pup tent. Consequently, they can be older, or more nervous (even much too much so to be worthy of consideration for duty farther to the front). Into this same category would fall all cooks at overseas air, service, or naval force installations, except the most forward fighter and supply bases. *To put a perfectly physically qualified man on duty as a cook at an installation hundreds or thousands of miles behind the lines as we have done and are still doing, is a misuse of manpower.* Now, when we get back to permanent or semi-permanent installations in the Zone of the Interior, all we need is someone who was sufficiently physically fit to be a cook at any Stateside restaurant. Age limits here could well go up to the sixties or over. Certain nervous disorders which have hitherto been considered as automatic disqualification for duty in the armed forces could be waived. Standards for eyesight, hearing, and teeth could come way below what is now considered a minimum even for non-combat duty.

THE overall position of motor vehicle drivers is roughly the same as that for cooks. The quarter-ton driver of the line companies must have nearly the same profile as that of the rifleman, again with the same exception—slightly flat feet should not be disqualifying here. Otherwise he should be vigorous and have a high degree of stamina. Only slightly less rigorous standards will apply to all other drivers who normally operate forward of the division CP. For drivers, eyesight and hearing and physical coordination cannot drop as low as for clerks and cooks, but the use of older men, men with varicose veins, few or no natural teeth, some blood pressure, and heart conditions, should be the rule rather than the exception. One of the sights that galled combat men during World War II was perfectly healthy fit youngsters assigned as jeep and sedan drivers around the U.S. or in the British Isles, during the months infantry replacements were coming out of the bottom of the manpower barrel.

These examples could be continued, but once the basic principle is accepted, as it sooner or later must be, it is only a matter of thorough surveys by competent boards with the proper back-

ing from top authority. By competent boards I mean boards composed of men who can see both the big and little picture through experience, who know the field they have under study and have the expert medical advice. In times of war or general mobilization the probable increase in pension liability of the government because of the induction of what was hitherto considered substandard personnel is a valid consideration when weighed against the necessity for combat replacements.

DURING World War II we had a short and sad experience with the drafting of men over 38. After a trial period most of them were given the opportunity of (and, in fact, many were pushed into) asking for discharge. The statement was then made that proportionately too many of them were in the hospitals. Why were they in the hospitals? The answer is clearly established. It was because we threw them into ground combat units and expected them to be able to take that training. When they failed to measure up to that we discharged them, at the same time we allowed young, vigorous, healthy men by the tens of thousands to stay in non-combat, non-hardship jobs. Certainly those older men could have done magnificently in these other jobs. Some of them literally fought their way


into service jobs rather than return to civilian life in the middle of a shooting war. There, from all I have heard, they performed well and on the whole better than younger men for whom such jobs did not represent an adequate outlet for their physical and mental energies.

WE must do some deep thinking and planning in the use of our most priceless and most limited war material: manpower. In this thinking we must be prepared to eliminate any of our old slogans, shibboleths, and outworn ideas that stand in the way of the most efficient use of what we have available. Otherwise, in a long and hard struggle with numerically superior foes we are rapidly going to find ourselves with ground combat forces dwindling in both quantity and quality and no qualified replacements in sight. *We cannot afford in the national interest to continue those same very costly mistakes in manpower usage and misuse.*

Our slogan cannot be "Every man a trained combat fighter"—that is wastage of manpower. Our slogan must be "every fit man a trained and potential combat fighter, every other man utilized and trained for the job which can use his potential to the fullest." Combat type training for these other men can be cut to the absolute minimum.

Highly skilled cartographers and men skilled in other equally critical professions or trades must be used where their special talents are most needed.






The C-119 Flying Boxcar was developed during the year for its high-wing, long-range cargo and troop transport powered by four Allison very high speed engines. First flight is reported early in 1954.



The CH-47 Chinook is a helicopter developed by the United States Army for transport and assault. It is the largest helicopter in the world and is capable of carrying up to 66 troops or 14,000 pounds of cargo.





The Making of a Marine

COLONEL A. T. McANSH

The boot training of our own Marine Corps has a world-wide reputation. We all know something about it; most of us enough to be quite sure that it wouldn't work for any military force that has the large and complex commitments of our Army. However, it is always possible to learn something from the way the other fellow does things.

We are particularly fortunate that the author of this piece is a Regular Army officer. If we had a Marine write about boot training we are sure that many readers would dismiss it as more evidence of the Corps' great capacity for blowing its own horn loudly (not a bad trait in itself). If we had a professional writer from civilian life do it, he might get across the superficial manifestations without ever catching the inner forces that transform a civilian into a fighting man. No one could have done it better for us than Colonel McAnsh, who was himself a "boot" thirty years ago.

MY experience at the receiving end of a training division occurred with a rival outfit at Parris Island, where Marine "boots"—recruits to you—are transformed into marines. That was thirty years ago—1923—but the memory of it is still vivid, as you will see if you read on.

The first lasting impression the boot receives on Parris Island and the last one

he takes away with him is that of his Drill Instructor, so a word of explanation on this individual is in order.

DIs are sergeants and corporals assigned to boot training companies for the purpose of imparting instruction into boots and moulding them into marines. They conduct all basic instruction, the great majority of all other instruction, and also perform a great many other tasks as well, and very well. The DI is always to the front in boot instruction; the officer well back. This is done deliberately. The reasoning is this: The NCO who leads the men across the beachhead or the last 100 yards of open ground between himself and the enemy is the one who can best train the impressionable boot. The boot will listen to him with respect and follow him in com-

COLONEL A. T. McANSH, Infantry, has been a military man since 1923, serving in the Marine Corps, the National Guard and the Regular Army. During the Second World War he served with the 33d Infantry Division in the Pacific. He is a graduate of the Command and General Staff School and the National War College. Recently he completed a tour of duty in Brazil and is now posted for the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg.



bat—he has been trained to. The NCO by virtue of this chance of demonstrating his leadership with recruits gets confidence in himself and is better fitted, therefore, to lead others in combat. It is a full circle—the thing feeds itself.

How do these DIs get their stuff across? What do they teach? What was the form of supervision?

TO speak from the things I witnessed is best. The sole overhead of my boot company (actually a platoon of 65 men) consisted of one buck sergeant and two corporals. No officers were permanently assigned and no permanent squad leaders. With the exception of a few specialized subjects such as chemical warfare and rifle-pistol marksmanship or a

few inspirational talks by officers along with a little tactical instruction, the three training noncoms carried the entire training load, trained us, moulded us, badgered us from daylight to dark for thirteen never-to-be-forgotten weeks.

Where did the squad leaders come from, for one must have them? Very simple: from among the 65 boots themselves. At the first formation, Sergeant Doyle (our Chief DI) called out, "All former servicemen, former Regulars, National Guardsmen and military school graduates, fall out over here." About ten or twelve did so. Doyle lined them up and asked each a question, looked them over, and eight of them were briskly detailed as "Provisional Squad Leader, First Squad"; "Provisional Squad Leader, Second Squad," and so on. Thus the company was formed. Based on past experience, plus extra studying and some extra coaching by the three noncoms, these eight played a creditable part in moulding those under themselves into marines. It was a good laboratory for testing leadership. If one of them couldn't cut the mustard, back he went into ranks and another was substituted.

ALL instruction was based on Army Infantry Drill Regulations, except for reviews (not parades), which were taken views (not parades), which were taken from and based on the *Landing Force Manual* of the Navy. An outstanding exception to our noncom instruction was rifle-pistol marksmanship. Marksmanship, particularly with the rifle, was specialized in with a vengeance. To the marine, his rifle is holy and is issued along with first issue of clothing and equipment. The serial number goes into his service record, and the rifle remains with him until he leaves the Corps. He polishes the stock lovingly and keeps it close to him. Whatever his specialty in the Corps, he must annually qualify with the rifle.

With this as a background, the boot went to the preparatory range for one week of grinding labor, followed by another at the firing range. His coaches without exception are sergeants. Before dismissing our company and turning us over to the rifle specialists, Doyle casually informed us we were to be trained by the world's best shots: Sergeants who had won championships at Camp Perry. Doyle implied if we did not qualify 100 percent under this renowned tutelage and thus disgraced him, the company and the Corps, we had best go over the hill and hunt up the nearest Army recruiting station.

The instruction was thorough and professional and if the boot tried he was helped. If, however, he got out of the four-ring too often, or appeared to be goofing off, a gentle reminder from his coach, "What's the matter, Jack, are you yellow?" greeted him. The boot blinked back the angry tears, wriggled into the already tight sling, and vowed he would demonstrate to this bastard that someone else could shoot, too.

At the end of the day, as the dog-weary boots plodded several miles back to the barracks, Sergeant Doyle (having had one of his rare easy days) would call them to attention and indulge in some snappy cadence marching, just to let them know they were not as tired as they believed they were—and mostly to let them know they were back under their company sergeant's wing, and not to get too cocky about all the stuff the specialized birds had been handing out.

How about the Character Guidance Program? It was included, though I didn't hear it called by that name. Something definitely guided my character along impressively at times. I shall try to portray it in several "flashbacks."

Item. A bewildered applicant, feeling all of his eighteen years, slowly leaves the train that has brought him so far and, carrying his heavy suitcase, approaches the waiting truck that will take him the remaining distance to the launch, which in turn will take him across the water to Parris Island. A couple of natty marines stood in the rear of the truck near the dropped tailgate. "Give us your hand and we'll help you up," they said. Grateful for such kindness on their part, he did. Up he went, up, over, and ended up hard against the cab back. Bewildered, sore of head and heart, he pondered, and wondered just why the hell he's here. Aside from the recruiting sergeant (gentlemen all, due to policy and necessity), he has just met the Marine Corps.

Item. Somewhat later a group of applicants are lined up before a Marine major with his back to the flag. At the end of a short swearing in period, the applicants say "I do," a sergeant says "Follow me," and they end up at the barber shop.

What consideration! The boots file in. The barbers have an air of speed and efficiency. The customers are moved along quickly. The reason is simple. Five or six sweeps from head to back with the shears and the wise guy from Brooklyn, smoothing down his long curly duck-butt hair-do, is as bald as the rest of us. In a few brief moments each is



on a common and proper level—all done by a pair of hair clippers.

Item. Each of sixty-five boots picks up his heavy sea bag of gear issued him at the supply department, together with the rifle, slowly straggles over from the receiving depot to the East Wing (basic training) and into the company area. At the direction of the sergeant who led them, the sixty-five break ranks and move into the barrack to seek out a bunk.

IN the barrack the boot looks around. He notes the immaculate cleanliness of the floor—he will find out why later—the sparseness of the furnishings, and then a line of white plaques about eye level above many bunks. The inscriptions on them catch the eye: "Joseph C. Foster, Pvt., USMC. Killed in action. Soissons." "James Baxter, Sgt., USMC. Killed in action. Belleau Wood." "Howard Burke, Pvt., USMC. Killed in action. Mont Blanc." (These are not real names.) The list stretches on. The boot puts down his heavy sea bag and swallows hard. He was meant to.

Item. *First morning.* Time: early. Sixty-five boots are deep in an uneasy sleep, when the door opens, lights flash on, and a Voice barks: "Hit the deck." The Voice leaves and continues down the line of barracks, then starts back for the first one. The boots are sitting up rubbing their eyes except for one who is still snoring strong. An eagle look from the corporal, a quick step to the bunk, a heave, and the boot lands on the deck, bunk and bedding on top of him. The corporal strides out without a word or backward glance. The boot picks himself up amid the jeers of the others. Next morning "Hit the deck" penetrates his consciousness clearly.

Item. *First evening.* Sixty-five boots are back in barracks after the nightly movie, a required formation which included a short on how to strip an automatic rifle. A corporal walks in and says, "Get into your bathing suits." This is a new one. The beach is far away, but the boots comply.

OVER in the receiving depot, the boot had been handed a galvanized iron pail containing a straight razor, toilet kit, *The Marine's Handbook*, towel, and so on. In the bottom, however, was a bathing suit and two cartons of steel wool. This pail and contents cost the boot \$9.60, which was deducted from his \$20.80 monthly pay. (A big-hearted Navy had already taken out twenty cents from his pay for hospital recreation funds or something, I don't know—even to this day.) The boot

had looked it all over, at least the bathing suit looked good—beaches, blondes, fun. He got into it. Back comes the corporal and barks, "Break out your steel wool; break out your mess gear." The corporal sits down and gives a demonstration of what is wanted. A strong, clear, painful light dawns on the boots as the corporal begins polishing a sand-blasted canteen with the steel wool and explains that he wants every piece of mess gear polished and burnished until the inspecting general can use any portion of the mess equipment as a shaving mirror. Furthermore, we had just two weeks to do this little item in our spare time because there would be a full field inspection on the morning of the second Saturday with four drill companies present and Sergeant Doyle wants ours to be the best and he would surely raise hell if ours isn't. The boots wondered mildly just what Sergeant Doyle had been doing so far.

For the rest of the evening and for two weeks of evenings thereafter, except for time out for movies and fights, the boots worked away on the mess gear, rubbing away at the metal with sore hands (I still hate the feel of steel wool), cursing the DIs, the Corps and everything in sight. All except the Provisional Squad Leaders, who discreetly kept their ears and mouths shut, thought their own thoughts and polished away on *their* mess gear. Occasionally the corporal (the sergeant remained in lofty seclusion in his room) would saunter in, look around, then wait for some boot to ask if he thought his piece of equipment would pass muster. "Corporal, sir, look at this!" (Sergeants and corporals on PI always were addressed as "Sergeant or Corporal, sir.") The corporal would look it over, then finally grudgingly admit it might pass. At other times he would park on a bunk and reel off portions of the instructions on Interior Guard Duty (no boot could leave the company area until he knew his General and Special Orders) or some other manual, callously ignoring the black looks or occasional angry tears. When he left, his ancestry was discussed in minute detail.

The time gradually went by and on the second Saturday morning, four boot companies pound out on the field, pass in review and lay out equipment as they have been told to do. Under the lashing tongue of Sergeant Doyle, adjuring them to be the first to get equipment laid out (as he was later hounding them to be first to be reassembled).

Equipment out, everyone stands at rigid attention. Eyes front. Out of the


corners of his eyes, the boot sees 250 sets of mess equipment shining in the sun in orderly rows like burnished sterling. He is impressed. For the first time he gets a glimmer of light on the whole thing.

Do you get the general idea? I think so. Character Guidance programs are a fine thing. One just has to be careful of all that goes into them.

How about time to see the inspecting general? Well, that was all arranged too. Come to think of it, the overworked Doyle must have doubled in brass too because I distinctly remember him saying at regular and frequent intervals that if anyone did not like the way he was running things he would always be happy to give him an interview behind the "head" with stripes off. I do not recall any interviews with the inspecting general by any of our boots.

Shirts came off at other times, though. The constant pressure had to have outlets and having no other outlet, the boots took it out on one another. In the chow line, in ranks, or during the infrequent breaks, a sudden sharp word or an accidental (or not) jab with an elbow was enough to cause a right to the jaw. The flurry immediately caused the ever-present sergeant or corporal to rush up with a righteous show of anger demanding what in the hell it was all about—none of this in ranks—if you're such a raw-meat eater wait until after supper. And about three evenings a week as the boots were back in the barracks after supper, "Outside" sounded and the boots piled out and fell in (piled out is the correct term, as everything was always on the double). Down to the boxing ring they go, and along with other drill companies, watch their own two men or two from some other company put on the gloves and fight it out until one has had enough, then shake hands. The company then hike back to their area in cadence. The tension is over, the athletics officer has picked up a few prospects for his next smoker, and the Character Guidance program has received a little extra shot of aggressiveness—for free.

How about liberty (leave to you) policy in town? How about the dames? This was extremely simple: there were no liberty and no dames. The nearest town was several miles away on the mainland, and for an amphibious-minded outfit, the boats were few and guarded, and the swim was long. The dames were all over on the mainland and it appeared they stayed there. If there had been any around for the boot to stare at before he dropped dead-tired on his bunk at the



In the process of teaching the boot, the DI transmits the priceless intangibles that make a man a marine.

end of the day, his interest in them would have been purely platonic.

THE instruction grinds on week after week, and parallel with it, subtly at the top, not so subtly at the bottom, goes the job of getting across to the boot the traditions and meanings of the Corps. He hears the Commandant tell the history of the Corps, the things it has done, how and by whom. Then he hears it repeated by others. He early learns to sing *From the Halls of Montezuma* and recognizes *Semper Fidelis*. He learns of other fighting outfits and is told that any marine who isn't equal to two sailors or three soldiers just isn't wanted. Slowly some of it penetrates, and he begins to believe that the Corps may be a good outfit (it's only bastards like Doyle that spoil things), and as his muscles toughen and his chest expands, so does his ego. But there is always a DI to cut him back again to size.

Doyle did not have everything his own way. He had to account for his actions, too. He had the normal chain of command over him—and that included another character as interesting in his ways as Doyle.

Sergeant Major Blake ran the office

—and other things—for the Training Group C.O., "Wild Bill" Wallace. The Sergeant Major was very efficient—and officious, too, according to some DIs. The boots got all of this second-hand from the orderlies for they were not made privy to such goings-on. But when a boot drill company got close to training group headquarters, they could hear Blake chewing out some luckless boot or DI with a vengeance. This might have been all in a day's work except that Blake was so interested in his work that he continued it at times down in the Sergeants' Club after a few beers—or something stronger sneaked in during Prohibition days—had been polished off.

He was somewhat at a disadvantage for he only weighed 145 with his clothes soaking wet, and inevitably some DI, stung to remonstrance, would methodically and efficiently take the Sergeant Major apart. But he was always at his desk the next morning, features somewhat disarranged, bellowing away, possibly at his opponent of the night before. Nothing personal—he had bellowed the same way the day before, too. The Colonel took no notice of his plastic surgery and the Sergeant Major did not enlighten him. He buried his own dead.

He just kept on raising hell in the office and at the club. Just as inevitably some DI took him apart again.

Gradually the boots harden, the hair gradually grows to respectable length, and with it a growing look of confidence comes into the boots' eyes. They obey unquestionably now. They find out marching in cadence is easy. They find themselves counting cadence off duty, stopping suddenly shamefacedly. They sing the Marine hymn with gusto. They are secretly proud of the Corps and acquire a grudging respect for Sergeant Doyle. They keep all this to themselves, though, while proclaiming loudly what a "chicken outfit" this is and what they will do to that Bastard Doyle when they get off the island.

AND what of the officer corps which sparked and directed this activity, from afar and on high?

My experiences with it at Parris Island were limited to a small amount of tactical instruction, some company drill (when four boot companies were put together), the pay table, parades. I only remember one vividly—the C.O. of the Training Center, Colonel "Wild Bill" Wallace. He was a character, always


even-tempered, always mad. We saw him infrequently, but sometimes heard him when the company was drilling near headquarters and some luckless boot was on the carpet for some infraction of the rules. The colonel must have been raised on a Spartan diet—at least he believed in handing one out. "Five days bread and water," he would bellow, and the boot started across the "grinder" (drill field) to partake of his "Angel Cake and Wine" as the Gyrenes called it, in five days of solitary philosophical contemplation of his navel.

"Wild Bill" was not the only colorful officer in that colorful Corps. There were plenty of conscientious and quiet ones too, but we talked of the others. The great Goettge of football fame (killed at Guadalcanal), his equally famous running mate "Harry the Horse" Liversedge; the one and only Smedley D. Butler with his two stars and two Medals of Honor, and always the legendary Captain Louis Cukela ("Cuke" behind his back) with his Sam Goldwyn use of the King's English: "Squad right two times and don't — 'em up!" "Next time I send a damn fool, I go myself."

The officers came from many places and schools, a few from Annapolis, VMI, University of Maryland, The Citadel and many direct by way of Belleau Wood. But they all had one common characteristic—a fighting heart, possibly best personified by Captain "Cuke." When you looked at his ex-DI face and his fearless eyes, you hardly needed to glance at the two Medal of Honor ribbons on his chest to know that Kuke would always be the "Point." You didn't care if he misused the English language. You didn't care if he couldn't read it.

And this fighting heart is good for any leader of fighting men to have. The ancient Romans put up a statue to the general who saved them in one of Rome's darkest hours, with this inscription: "Because he did not despair of the Republic."

All things come to an end. Advanced training is completed. A full issue of field equipment is next, accompanied by a full field inspection of all equipment and clothing. The boots line up for initial assignments. Assignments are filled as much as possible on a volunteer basis. They wait for Sergeant Major Blake to yell out places. "Haiti—over here! Cuba! Santo Domingo! Seagoing! Aviation School!" Even then aviation was popular. Lucky applicants go on, some of them to become successful enlisted pilots. (In Nicaragua I saw sergeants flying three-motored Ford transports as part of flights



The eighth week arrives and the DI wheels his boots through their final parade.

making food and supply drops to columns deep in the hills.) Finally all are assigned. Orders are published. Time to put the show on the road.

THE boot's final parade. All companies participate, but his company is on the Right of the Line. The boot, his hair grown out again to a respectable $\frac{3}{4}$ -inch regulation length, and resplendent in his dress blues, worn for the first time, stands proudly at attention awaiting the command PASS IN REVIEW! He looks at Doyle out in front of him, putting those boots through their paces for the last time. Can it be that his face has actually taken on a semblance of kindness? He wonders. There goes the command, the band sounds off and the companies swing into line. The boot grips the butt of his rifle fiercely and does his best to insure a perfect line. They go past "Wild Bill" Wallace. EYES RIGHT—FRONT—RIGHT BY SQUADS. The company moves out across the "grinder" to the company area. Sergeant Doyle informs them they looked good without the usual limiting adjectives. The boot feels all is well. Swinging along in quick cadence, he finds it good. The thrilling strains of his song, *Semper Fidelis*, come down the wind. The picture becomes clear—everything is in focus. The grind of the past weeks has meaning, it has all been to make him a marine. He glances around right and left. His bud-

dies seem to have got it too. He and his swing along with a lighter step and a lighter heart. They have got the word. By a curious alchemy not known completely even to those who participate and guide it, the Man and the Corps have become as one.

AND moving on to other stations, happy to be away from Parriis Island and Sergeant Doyle, for whom he now has a wholesome respect tinged with admiration and no little fear, he finds he meets him again in a new guise, a little less gruff perhaps with different technique, "Knock off the Sergeant-Sir—boot stuff!" But First Sergeant Novak lets him know that he too agrees with George Washington in that "Discipline is the soul of an army" (and a Marine Corps). The new easier regime is easier only by comparison with what he has just left. Intuitively, he sees that was the general idea all along.

And that is the way I found them. And left them. But I followed their progress with interest, for once having been one of them the stuff does not rub off easily. And later as the Corps expanded twentyfold in a war big enough for all to get in and enjoy, I checked to see if the product I knew had been too thoroughly diluted by the fast expansion. I concluded that it had not, that the DIs and the "grinder" were still clicking.

LOGISTICS

PREVIEW TO LOGEX-54

WHEN Lieutenant General W. B. Palmer returned from command of the X Corps in Korea, he observed that "training of future commanders has not prepared them to cope with their logistic problems as skillfully as they cope with tactical problems." One of the functions of LOGEX-54, a logistical map maneuver scheduled for 3-8 May at Camp Pickett, Va., is to help overcome this weakness in our service. Some 2,100 soldiers and Wacs of the logistical services will "play" the exercise, in an earnest effort to learn more about logistical support.

General Palmer, now G4 of the General Staff, has pointed out that although the United States has based its first line of defense overseas, "all of us [commanders] still have a lot to learn about conducting overseas wars and supporting dependent allies." And an overseas war is exactly the setting for LOGEX-54, with the participants solving on paper all kinds of problems involved in supporting a Type Field Army in an invasion of southern France. (Southern France has been the locale of all six previous Logex "problems.")

There are three types of logistical commands. A Type A command is used to support a combat force of approximately 30,000 men; a Type B command supports a combat force of some 100,000 men, and a Type C command supports a force of 400,000 men. The latter is the size of the hypothetical combat force used in LOGEX-54.

The postwar emergence of logistical commands proved successful in Korea. And the annual LOGEX-type exercises, which began in 1948, helped develop them.

THE annual LOGEX problem is unique and a little history should be of interest. Some 14 technical and administrative service schools will take part in LOGEX-54, whereas in 1948 only two schools—Quartermaster and Transportation—participated. That 1948 exercise actually had its beginning the year before at the Quartermaster School. The Commandant of the School, dissatisfied with the practical training his advanced officer students were receiving, since it



LOGEX transportation is geared to the terrain of Southern France

left unanswered the question of how well these students would perform under combat conditions, directed the setting up of a CP Exercise in which the students were assigned to fill the various Quartermaster staff positions. The results were satisfying, but left unanswered the question of interservice coordination, so in 1948 the Transportation School was invited to take part in a combined CPX.

In 1949, under a Department of the Army directive, 10 of the service schools took part in the exercise, known then as "Exercise LOG LEE." And the following year, more service schools participated, as did Air Force and Navy representatives. The 1950 exercise, held at Fort Belvoir, Va., was known for the first time as LOGEX.

No exercise was held in 1951, but in 1952 LOGEX was reinstated at Camp Pickett, Va., which has been its site since that time. The exercise reached a peak in participants last year, with some 3,500 uniformed persons participating. LOGEX-54 is expected to be even larger.

In addition to representatives from all of the technical and administrative services, the Command and General Staff College and the Army General School will participate as will representatives of the Navy and State Departments. The latter will fulfill the present-day concept that each field army commander should have a political advisor on his special staff.

THE tactical situation created for LOGEX-54 is in the same geographical area as the invasion of southern France during World War II. The student officers and reservists will hold positions in (1) the special staff sections of the invading Army and the Type C Logistical Command supporting that Army, and (2) the headquarters of certain of

the larger service units of those two major commands.

Control officers will hold positions at higher headquarters and will represent subordinate units in order to present these requirements to the student players.

The play centers around the logistical support necessary to keep the combat elements fighting effectively, rather than the tactics necessary to defeat an enemy in battle. Each student player will learn more about what is expected of his own service in supporting the combat forces. He will also become familiar with the missions of his sister services and the coordination needed for effective support. Coordination between the services is difficult to impose upon the students in their schools, and can best be presented to them in an exercise such as LOGEX.

While other exercises this year will present various aspects of chemical, biological, and radiological warfare to the combat arms, LOGEX-54 will at the same time give the logistical services practical experience in meeting an enemy utilizing those devices. The Medical Service and others will cope with the threat of biological warfare. The Chemical Corps and other services will be concerned with combatting chemical attacks and planning to support retaliatory measures. All participants will learn of radiological problems, as well as of thermal and blast effects, when atomic bombs are theoretically dropped behind our lines.

Thus LOGEX-54, by providing practical experience, under simulated conditions, will serve to carry out the needs, pointed out by General Palmer, for more logistical training. Through the exercise, commanders of the future will be more aware of logistical needs and the problems involved.

'OUR FINE NEW ARMY'

RELMAN MORIN

Associated Press Correspondent
in *The New York Journal-American*, 15 March 1954

WE were having dinner in the Generals' Mess in Korea the other night, and looking at the faces around the table, a thought suddenly struck me—

"The people at home don't have to worry about Americans' interests out here . . . they're in good hands."

The staff officers sitting there looked like the department heads of some hot-shot American corporation. They were all youngish, lean, incisive, alert. There wasn't an overstuffed colonel in the lot.

In the buzz of conversation, drifting through the room, there was some shop talk, naturally. But they also were talking politics, the Berlin conference, economic conditions at home, and a whole range of subjects outside the immediate purview of the Eighth Army and its officers in Korea.

This, of course, is the "new army."

It is bringing along a group of sharp young officers with brains, background and the ability to handle problems the old army never confronted. They are technicians and specialists in the various phases of warfare, to be sure. But they also have to be diplomats, administrators, and executives in the plain business sense of the word.

They may be occupied with a battalion front but they also are aware of military budgets, the relations between the army and Congress, and the shifting strategies of the global war.

Nobody typifies these men better than the commander of the Eighth Army, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor. Taylor is 52, lean, sinewy and looks like a college athlete. Because of his four stars, the staff call him "the old man," although he is only a few years older than most of them. Moreover, he can trim their ears off at tennis or handball, which he plays regularly.

He is a fighting soldier—the general who parachuted into Bastogne to rejoin his division, the 101st Airborne, when it was locked in the Battle of the Bulge.

Ever since he was a young officer, he has been in posts around the world that threw him in contact with problems of diplomacy and international relations. He speaks French, Spanish and Japanese, and picked up a working knowledge of Chinese while he was stationed in Peiping. Now he is studying Korean.

He has also started an education program in the army, directed mainly toward raising the educational level of the noncommissioned officers, the kingpins of any army. He visits the classrooms incessantly and keeps a constant check on the progress.

He is a soft-spoken man by nature, but he can be tough as nails.

Taylor is typical of America's "new army." You can't help but conclude: "our interests are in good hands, with men like these."

Eighth Army on guard in Korea



Inaccurate Rifles Make Inaccurate Riflemen

CAPTAIN STRAIGHT SHOOTER

An infantryman holds that we won't have great marksmen until they are given rifles that are not "bell-mouthed" or "muzzled." The Army Ordnance Department agrees.

KOREA was a "riflemen's war," as many have observed before me. Men coming back from Korea emphasized the need for riflemen who could shoot to kill. The Army began to concentrate on high standards of rifle marksmanship.

I was involved in this on a very low level. Having been in Korea where I had experienced the rifleman's war, I was quite prepared to teach men to shoot when I reported to a training division as chief of the weapons committee of

a regiment. During the next sixteen months I learned a great deal, some of it unpleasant.

I have seen training companies turn in scores, during record firing exercises, that did not truthfully reflect the actual scores fired. I have seen hundreds of misses scored as bull's-eyes. The only way to be certain of the proficiency of any particular company is to watch the hits on the targets. I submitted a written report on score cheating to the Division G3. Then a company was closely checked by scorers unknown to the firer. The results were shocking. Of 190 men, only 80 qualified. What was the reason

for such poor shooting by "trained" men?

My answer is that *most of the rifles used by that particular company were not accurate by any of our standards.* Did I fire each rifle to test its accuracy? No, but let me continue.

I was on leave in my quarters at the time the company fired, however. I received a phone call at my home from the battalion S3. He told me that the company had boloed 110 out of 190 men. I told him I'd be out to show him why. When I got to the tactical training area, the company was dispersed throughout the area. However, one platoon of thirty-nine men was available. I asked the platoon sergeant to call this platoon in and have every man who had failed to qualify on the range, step forward with his rifle. Twenty men stepped forward. I inserted a caliber .30 ball into each of the twenty rifle muzzles. In each case the ball was inserted freely, without force, until the brass case touched the muzzle. What did this prove? It proved that the rifling in every case was completely worn out close to the muzzle end of the barrel. The diameter of the ball was exactly .3075 inch. I used a Starret 0-1 inch micrometer to take measurements. The Ordnance Corps' maximum allowable breech reading of the M1 rifle is .305 inch.

COMMON sense reasoning will show that a bullet squeezing through a breach measuring .305 inch or less will not be accurately released from a muzzle measuring .3075 and larger. Why are rifles worn to such a degree, when Ordnance inspections supposedly eliminate such weapons? Simply this. *There is no provision for the use of a muzzle gauge with the M1 rifle.* I received this information officially. My informant neither

CAPTAIN STRAIGHT SHOOTER is the pseudonym of an infantryman now serving overseas.



Rifle No. 1. Worn out, could not be zeroed at 300 yards. Cartridge has been inserted ball first to the extent that only the brass case prevented further insertion. Ball diameter (next to brass) .3075 inch.



Rifle No. 2. Excellent condition; stayed in the 12-inch bull at 300 and the 20-inch bull at 500 yards. In this case the cartridge could not be inserted beyond the curve of the ball. This is the same cartridge used in Rifle No. 1.

PHOTOGRAPHS AND CAPTIONS BY THE AUTHOR



Rifle No. 1. This shows a ball inserted in the muzzle. The ball was not forced in any way, rather it dropped from the fingers to the position shown. The ball measured .308 inch at base.



Rifle No. 2. The same ball as inserted in Rifle No. 1 could not be inserted into the muzzle of this rifle. It had to be balanced on the muzzle to be photographed.

confirmed nor denied my contention that worn muzzles were largely the cause of poor marksmanship.

Why didn't we have rifles with worn muzzles replaced? We couldn't, because we had no authority to turn in such weapons.

"Since there is no muzzle gauge authorized for use with the M1 rifle, the diameter cannot be used as a standard of unserviceability," was the answer my plea for better rifles received. Can anyone say a rifle is no longer accurate? Yes. An Ordnance expert can tag a rifle if (a monstrous word), in his opinion, it has fired 8,000 to 10,000 rounds. Certainly there are many other reasons for tagging a rifle as unserviceable. I am speaking of accuracy only.

I have personally fired hundreds of M1 rifles that could not be zeroed at three hundred yards, some at one hundred yards. I usually fire in the high expert bracket with the rifle, the carbine, and the pistol, provided I select the

weapon. I have demonstrated on the range that a rifle with a worn muzzle could not be zeroed at three hundred yards by the best marksman available. The demonstration was observed by infantry officers only. Civilian weapons repairmen were convinced but would not commit themselves officially. There was one civilian ordnance repairman strongly antagonistic to my contentions, who said "the use of a caliber .30 ball as a gauge was wrong because they varied as much as two or three thousandths of an inch." This is not so. I have measured thousands of caliber .30 rounds with a micrometer and never found one to measure under .3075, nor over .308 inch—a high standard of manufacture, acknowledged as such.

In many instances our finest competitive shooters buy surplus service ammunition for their own loads. If our caliber .30 ball answers the needs of target shooters we can assume it to be good. As for using the ball as a gauge in

a given number of rifles, so long as we use the same ball, it is, for all practical purposes, a gauge. If the ball is inserted in the muzzle without force it will retain its original dimensions. Usually a glance at the muzzle end of a rifle will show the cause of inaccurate fire. I know from experience that few officers can determine when a rifle muzzle is worn out. I have seen many officers embarrassed because they could not determine the cause of inaccuracy in a rifle. This usually happened when one of them would attempt to show a trainee that it is "you, not the rifle, that is at fault" and end up red-faced because he was incapable of hitting the target. When an officer is the victim of such an incident the men he is training suffer too.

A little time and experience on the range will prove to you that a caliber .30 ball is a practical muzzle gauge. Of course many things can cause inaccuracy. You must check the front and rear sights for tightness. If the sights are tight, examine bore. If the barrel is not worn out, bent, ringed or improperly bedded, it should keep in the bull's-eye at three hundred yards—which is a reasonable range.

ORDNANCE CORPS DISSENTS

The Ordnance Corps was given the accompanying article and, at the request of the editors, prepared the following statement on the subject.

Bell Mouthing and Its Influence on the Accuracy of the M1 Rifle

REPORTS have been received in the past from field organizations indicating that eccentric muzzle wear (bell mouthing induced by the indiscriminate use of bore cleaning devices) is detrimental to the accuracy of the M1 Rifle. As a result thereof, extensive investigations were conducted at technically qualified Ordnance installations. In each instance, these investigations failed to establish a correlation between eccentric muzzle wear and inaccuracy.

In the course of the foregoing tests, ten reconditioned M1 Rifles were selected and targeted for basic accuracy by Springfield Armory. The muzzles of five of these weapons were then reamed to approximate an extreme degree of eccentric muzzle wear. Subsequent targeting revealed that this condition had little or no adverse effect on the accuracy of the weapons.

An additional number of inaccurate weapons evincing eccentric muzzle wear were obtained from the field. These rifles were representative of weapons used extensively and cleaned under normal field conditions. Tests of these weapons indicated that invariably, factors other than bell mouthing contributed to inaccuracy. Such deficiencies as heavy metal fouling in the bore, im-

proper bedding of the stock, bent barrels, torn lands, excessively pitted bores and burred gas ports were encountered during the investigation. The presence of one or more of the foregoing deficiencies could result in an inaccurate weapon.

Ordnance test engineers have determined that in most instances where evidence of eccentric muzzle wear is indicated to any extent, the barrel is usually unserviceable in other respects. In these instances, the pertinent weapons should be returned to depot maintenance for a complete overhaul.

It is the intent of the Ordnance Corps to provide the best maintenance possible for its weapons. However, certain extenuating circumstances do exist. Rifles that are utilized during training are subjected to considerable rough usage. These rifles are utilized in bayonet practice and field exercises and consequently may develop certain deficiencies, as noted in the above paragraph. Instructions are published in D/A technical manuals to provide Ordnance field personnel with information necessary to correct these deficiencies. In addition, an inferior weapon can result from inadequate preventive maintenance at the organizational level.

I SUBMITTED a suggestion through the efficiency awards committee of the training division, explaining my findings in detail. I suggested a solution to the problem of worn muzzles. I said that the steel cleaning rod was being improperly used and that it was bell mouthing our rifles. (See if you can find a straight cleaning rod in your unit after it has been used for a week.) I suggested that the thong be revived for cleaning the barrel and that a muzzle gauge be used during all Ordnance inspections. My suggestion was rejected. I was not consulted by Ordnance personnel, military or civilian. I then submitted another suggestion that was flatly turned down by the post ordnance officer. That precluded the suggestion being forwarded for an evaluation by higher authority. My recommendations showed how a steel pilot or guide could be used to protect the first inch of the muzzle (the delivery end) from the abrasive action of the cleaning rod.

This pilot is available in most sporting equipment stores. My idea was rejected because "each man would have to have a pilot." I asked, does each man have a cleaning rod? Then they said, "the pilot would get lost." No one had anything against the pilot as I intended it to be used—to protect the business ends of our rifles from the abuses to which they are subjected.

Unfortunately the trainee has little or no conception of the damage he causes by continually rubbing the bore of his rifle with a steel rod, usually one bent beyond practical use. He knows no better because he has not been impressed with the importance the lands and grooves play in the accuracy of his rifle.

Does he look to see if his rifle lands are sharp and that the bore is not ringed or pitted? No. He looks to see if a speck of dust is waiting to give someone an excuse for not giving him a pass. Watch a squad of trainees, or veterans for that matter, "clean" their rifles. You'll see them wearing the lands out of the rifle by abrasion. And the Army provides the tools.

Sincere infantrymen can talk of better sighting and aiming devices, carloads of extra ammunition for practice, and emphasis on the fine old American tradition of accurate rifle fire, but they won't get it if the rifles aren't accurate.

WE can revive our tradition of American marksmanship by first checking the muzzles of our weapons.

The problem is big but it is not insurmountable and it can be licked. We, the infantry, can test-fire every rifle in every squad in every battalion, in every regiment, in every division, until we eliminate rifles that can't be zeroed at three hundred yards—a very reasonable range. We have men who are expert shots. If they can't zero a rifle, using sandbag rests as all record holders do, then eliminate that rifle for re-barreling. Economy-minded people may say that it would be too expensive. Isn't it cheaper than expending ammunition fired from inaccurate rifles? If the infantryman must "shoot to kill" then the infantryman must be able to say "this rifle is no longer accurate enough to meet our traditions." Let Ordnance issue us our tools but give us the right to decide the quality. It is our lives that are at stake.

If we try and cannot zero, the weapon must be repaired. How much does it cost to re-barrel an M1 rifle? I don't know, couldn't care less, and I do pay taxes. I do know this: trainees have fired up to 400 rounds during practice and record firing with a rifle that is useless so far as accuracy is concerned. The cost of those 400 rounds would surely cover the cost of replacing a defective barrel. There is nothing complicated about it and it could be done at division level.

We would then be ready to produce men who could shoot with confidence, men who would seek targets instead of avoiding them.

Words to Help You Serve

(Continued from page 3)

GENERAL DEVERS—

and potentialities; the influences of parents, friends, or successful individuals whom you admire; and the varied fields of endeavor stretching out before you. In order not to be swept along by the prevailing wind, you must know yourself; make an unbiased appraisal of the influences playing upon you; then weigh carefully those careers that appeal most to you.

In 1905 when I entered the United States Military Academy, the Army offered certain basic things, as it does today: a life of service to your country and to your fellowman (and if this sounds too idealistic to you, examine yourself to determine what better goal you can have); high standards of morality and integrity; and security, including medical care of yourself and your family. At the time I made my decision the Army offered a fairly good education and a limited amount of travel.

Today, recognizing that the indispensable weapon is man, the Army is geared to train its own

technologists and technicians to carry on the most diversified, vast and global business ever attempted in the history of mankind. At the Army's expense you can earn a master's or doctor's degree—you can even compete, under ideal conditions, for a Rhodes scholarship.

Unlimited travel opportunity may take an Army man to Alaska, Europe, the Middle East, Asia—almost anywhere in the world; teaches him to live under all conditions of terrain, weather, and climate; introduces him to every race and custom; allows him to examine closely conditions under varying political setups abroad; and in the final analysis proves to him conclusively the unquestionable merit of the free democratic way of life and the glory and privilege that are his in defending it.

After forty-four years of active service—if I had my life to plan over, it would be the Army for me. I can think of no more stimulating or satisfying life.

GENERAL CLAY—

importance of the ground forces to our national security in these days of atomic and thermonuclear power. If so, they should remember that there will always be a need for ground forces to seize and occupy the important bases throughout the world and to prevent unrest and to restore order in combat areas. It may become a much more mobile force than in the past, but its importance to victory if war should come will never disappear.

Today, the Army with its diversified opportunities and relatively rapid promotion, looks far more promising than it did following World War I when national security received scant attention. I served approximately twenty years as a junior officer in an Army

which had few troops and little, if any, new equipment during this period. Yet it had faith in itself and managed to maintain high morale and intellectual growth in its commissioned service.

The Army gave me the opportunity to see many parts of the world, to live and associate with many fine and able persons devoted to the welfare of their country. It enabled me to at least accept the challenges of higher responsibilities. If I had the choice before me now, I would not give up or trade the days I spent in the Army and I left it with a sense of obligation which I shall never lose.

If the young men of today are selling the Army short, they are making a great mistake.

CAREER MANAGEMENT AND YOUR FUTURE

No. 9 Reserve Component Duty

THE contribution of our reserve components to the winning of the nation's wars is recorded in history. To insure the same high degree of participation in the future, the regular establishment must give full and active support to the peacetime training of reserve component elements. This article deals with an important phase of that support: the assignment of officers as reserve component advisors or instructors.

Reserve Officers' Training Corps, National Guard and Army Reserve programs were reinstituted following World War II and large numbers of qualified instructors and advisors of the various arms and services were assigned to duty with the reserve components.

At the present time, the number of officers assigned to reserve component duties is determined on a broad basis by the Department of the Army. Within the limits of these broad outlines, the number of officers required for reserve component duties is determined by the Army commanders who bear the responsibility for the training and instruction of the ROTC, National Guard, and Army Reserve units in their commands. Selections and assignments of officers to reserve components are made by career branches of the various arms and services, in response to requisitions received from the field. Officers on active duty desiring assignments to reserve component duty may, if they meet the requirements outlined in SR 600-145-20, "Assignment to Reserve Component and Reserve Officers' Training Corps Duty," apply through channels for such duty.

THE tour of field grade officers assigned to reserve component duty is normally 36 months; company grade 12 months, with the exception of ROTC company grade instructors, which is 24 months. However, if not needed to fill urgent overseas requirements, or military schooling, officers may be permitted to continue to serve on reserve component duty for periods up to one year beyond the normal tour.

The Special Regulation referred to above prescribes qualification criteria for the assignment of officers to the re-

serve components. Requirements range in grade from colonel to captain of the combat arms and technical services although substitutions in grade may be made. Also, warrant officers and enlisted personnel are assigned to the reserve components as assistant instructors, assistant advisors and clerical and administrative assistants.

It is desirable that Regular Army officers serve at least one tour of duty with one of the reserve components. However, such duty is not limited to Regulars. National Guard and Army Reserve officers on active service are used in all reserve component instructor-advisor positions except as National Guard advisors in the state of legal residence prior to entrance on active duty.

Repetitive assignments to the same component or level of duty are normally avoided. When it is necessary for the good of the service to relieve an officer before he completes the normal tour, he will be credited with completion of full tours. Reassignment of such officers to reserve component duty is not required; however, they may be reassigned if the needs of the service demand it.

THE Army General Staff and high command give full weight to the importance of the reserve as a major element of our armed forces. It would be well for any officer receiving a reserve component assignment to take careful stock of his qualifications. He can improve his record as well as raise the reputation of the officer corps among the civilian population. It is particularly important that officers selected for reserve component duties possess, to a high degree, certain qualities. Some of these are:

Respect the civilian status of reservists. Consideration must be given to the interests of the reservist when making demands which cannot be met without serious injury to his business, profession or personal relations. Most reservists do not resent this if it is obviously necessary.

Professional knowledge. Members of the defense team not on active duty expect the Army Advisor to be fully

qualified. As one National Guard general put it: "If you don't know more about military matters than I do, a lot of taxpayers' money has been wasted on your training."

Personality and leadership. On this type of duty command relationship often is from nebulous to nonexistent. Application of the finest principles of leadership is necessary. Every act or utterance may influence people but will not necessarily make friends. Lack of tact and impatience in unimportant matters are certain to negate the efforts of otherwise qualified advisors.

Outward manifestations of personal conduct, such as temperance, careful selection of associates, impeccable grooming, attention to duty and other actions, enhance the prestige of the Army in local communities. This is particularly significant on the college campus where character is being molded. In any assignment, personal conduct below the standards established by the officers' corps cannot and will not be condoned.

The attitude of the officer's wife and family. This is a delicate matter but it must be remembered that a wife's attitude toward and conduct in the community has a profound bearing on her husband's effectiveness. This is applicable to his children. Objectionable incidents involving other members of the family will materially nullify an officer's otherwise outstanding performance record.

Standard of living and maintenance of credit rating. An officer must maintain prestige of his position by an appropriate standard of living but he must live within his financial means. An officer may be a complete failure because of his inability to meet financial obligations.

SO long as a major part of our military strength is in the reserve, reserve component duty will continue to be one of the most important in the Army. Officers and enlisted men selected for reserve component duty must be capable of superior performance. The prestige of the Army demands it; the safety of our country requires it.

The Word from the Artillery School

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

ARTILLERY QUOTATION OF THE MONTH

The battlefield achievements of the artillery arm have enhanced the prestige of the entire American Army as well as its own reputation.

MAJOR GENERAL HARRY F. HAZLETT
14 June 1943

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Progress on FM 6-40

Revision of the artilleryman's "bible"—FM 6-40, *Field Artillery Gunnery*, dated January 1950—is up to schedule. A representative sample of ideas and suggestions from the field has been reviewed.

In addition to requests carried here for comments and suggestions (*COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL*, December 1953), queries were mailed directly to more than 100 selected persons and officers including certain general officers and the PMS&Ts of artillery ROTC units. The number of individual and unit replies is gratifying. Approximately 20 general officers have responded; a reply from the 59th Infantry Heavy Mortar Company—a reserve unit in Nogales, Ariz.—indicates the widespread interest in this project.

These contributions are greatly appreciated by TAS and others are urged to forward pertinent remarks without delay. Material should be submitted directly to: The Director, Department of Gunnery, TAS, Fort Sill, Okla.

End of Mission

As part of its overall effort to reduce radio transmission time, TAS now teaches that to indicate sufficient fire has been delivered on a particular target the observer need send only the words "end of mission" to FDC. There is no objection to the phrase "cease fire" when used before "end of mission," but it isn't necessary.

TAS Continues Reorganization

TAS has discontinued the Department of General Subjects as it presses to consolidate and streamline school activities which began with the general reorganization of July 1953 (*COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL*, September 1953).

Functions and responsibilities formerly

assigned to the Department of General Subjects have been transferred to the Office of the Deputy Assistant Commandant and to the Department of Combined Arms. The Examination Review Board, The Artillery School Instructor Training Program, and the Corrective Reading Program have been added to the functions of DAC; while combined Arms has been given the Methods of Instruction Division and the Management Division.

MARS at TAS

Two Military Affiliate Radio System (MARS) stations have been extremely active at Fort Sill during the past several months: Station AA5USA is operated and maintained by personnel of the Department of Communications, and post agencies; amateur radio station K5WAH (MARS call sign: AA5WAH) is maintained by post signal personnel.

Under the supervision of a post MARS director, the stations have rekindled a statewide interest in the military affiliate system; and membership has nearly doubled. Increased participation in the future is expected.

At TAS, students in communications courses are taken on tour through AA5USA and are encouraged to study and apply for an amateur license. This station handles varying amounts of both official and quasi-official traffic with other military installations. Station K5WAH is available to licensed amateurs stationed at Fort Sill who are separated from their own equipment.

Snow Hall

TAS is awaiting the completion of Snow Hall, its new and magnificent \$2,500,000 academic building. It is expected to be completed by 1 July.

The completely air-conditioned, two-story structure will be large enough to house 50 classrooms and 2,500 students. Its interior occupies some 190,000 square feet of floor space.

The building consists of an auditorium, classrooms, offices, a lounge, storage rooms, snack bar, kitchen, mechanical equipment room, textbook and instrument issue rooms, dressing rooms and a rapid reading room.

It is named for the late Maj. Gen. William J. Snow, the first Chief of Field Artillery.

'The Artillery Has Been Terrific'

A letter received by The Artillery School, Fort Sill:

The Hague, January 26, 1954

Reading *COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL*, January 1954, I came upon your article about famous artillery quotations. Being an artillery officer myself with interests in artillery quotations, who can stimulate the *esprit de corps* I received from a friend a copy of a tribute to the Royal Regiment of Artillery by Field-Marshal Montgomery, which I will give you here.

"I would like to pay a compliment to the gunners and I would like this to be passed on to every gunner. The gunners have risen to great heights in this war. They have been well commanded and well handled. In my experience the artillery has never been so efficient as it is today: it is at the top of its form.

For all this I offer you my warmest congratulations. The contributions of the artillery to final victory in the German war have been immense. This will always be so: the harder the fighting and the longer the war the more the infantry and in fact all the arms, lean on the gunners. The proper use of the artillery is a great battle-winning factor.

I think all the other arms have done very well too. But the artillery has been terrific and I want to give due weight to its contribution to the victory in this campaign.

B. L. MONTGOMERY

Field-Marshal

C in C 21 Army Group"

Germany, 27-6-45.

If it is possible for you to send a copy of your already distributed quotations I will be very grateful.


Yours very truly

JOE H. BUITENHUIS

1st Lt Royal Netherlands Arty

Bachmanstraat 25

The Hague, Netherlands





KENT ROBERTS GREENFIELD

The Month's Books

Two of the books under review this month are weapons in the current campaign to restore pride of unit in the United States Army. Dr. Greenfield's "The Historian and the Army" is a useful flanking attack on the subject; the work of Army historians certainly is close to the preservation of unit esprit. The second book provides logistical support for the campaign by detailing the formal histories of the infantry regiments now on the rolls of the Army.

The next two reviews discuss books that cover great sweeps of history. Oman's book is a classic of military history that few American soldiers have ever read and Mr. Cyril Falls' survey of warfare in the last 100 years is a handy outline and guide.

The final four reviews are concerned with Soviet Russia and China. We especially commend to you Colonel Dupuy's comments on U. S. involvement in Russia during the years of the Revolution.

Historians of the Army

THE HISTORIAN AND THE ARMY
By Kent Roberts Greenfield
Rutgers University Press, 1954
99 Pages; Map; \$2.50

Reviewed by

MAJ. GEN. H. W. BLAKELEY, Ret.

Dr. Greenfield, Chief Historian of the Department of the Army, is convinced that unless history is written promptly it cannot be written correctly or adequately. In this little book, based on a series of lectures which he gave at the College of Puget Sound, Dr. Greenfield is primarily attempting to invite public attention to what he calls "the most ambitious enterprise in the writing of contemporary history that has been undertaken in our time"—the history of the United States Army and its Air Forces in World War II. As most military men know, the preparation, and in fact the publication, of this series of more than sixty volumes is well along. Considered in connection with Admiral S. E. Morison's semi-official history of the naval operations of World War II, the promptness and thoroughness with which that struggle is being covered is "unprecedented"—to again quote Dr. Greenfield.

If it is easier to write accurate and complete history while the people who made it are still alive, it also harder to write honest history. Living officers of high rank may have their feelings hurt. Dr. Greenfield quotes General Devers as saying to him, "Well, isn't that the kind of wound a soldier has to take?" This was typical, Dr. Greenfield says, of the attitude of the Army high command: "If we have not succeeded in putting out honest history it has been our own fault."

There are of course some skeptics who are of the opinion that people, even though they be professional historians, who are writing about the Army and being paid by the Army are not likely to be either completely objective or as candid as they might be under different circumstances.

Dr. Greenfield's answer to this is to cite General Eisenhower's agreement, as Chief of Staff, to three conditions proposed by Dr. Greenfield: freedom of access to all records necessary to write a comprehensive history; freedom to call the shots as the historians see them; and the individual responsibility of the author of each volume attested to by the putting of his name on the book. "This," says Dr. Greenfield, "adds up to academic freedom."

On the basis of some personal acquaintance with both the professional historians in the Office of the Chief of Military History (currently Maj. Gen. Albert Cowper Smith is Chief) and the Army officers on duty there, I believe that both groups take pride in writing and publishing facts. This does not mean that either group would subscribe to the idea that unfavorable facts should be accompanied by invective, or that unsubstantiated charges should be included in a historical narrative—even though it is a fact that charges have been made.

In scope, Dr. Greenfield's book extends from an account of the confused action, involving parts of the 7th Armored and 5th Infantry Divisions, at Dornot in September 1944 to a discussion of the problems and hazards of coalition strategy. Included are some perceptive comments on the Army's functions, methods, and troubles.

An example of particular interest to readers of this magazine is the author's

comments on the infantry-artillery team: "Divisional artillery, reinforced with a mass of corps and army artillery, was often the giant member of the team, and performed the decisive role in battle—a fact easily overlooked because modern military narration, like all tales of battle from time immemorial, tends to focus on men in motion. . . . In many decisive engagements the role of the infantry was not to break through but to occupy and mop up positions in which artillery concentrations had shattered the power of the foe."

Oddly, General Eisenhower in *Crusade in Europe* indicated that even he was misinformed on the subject of the artillery's part in the Normandy campaign. After describing the hedgerow country, he commented: "As would be expected under these conditions, the artillery, except for long-range harassing fire, was of little usefulness." In an article in *The Field Artillery Journal* (March-April 1949), this writer attempted to prove, entirely by infantry testimony, that General Eisenhower was misinformed.

On the vital subject of esprit, Dr. Greenfield makes the comment that "it was, and is, an article of faith in the Army that team spirit, the pride of the soldier in his unit, willingness to do and endure heightened by association with men with whom he has learned to work is vital to . . . battle effectiveness . . . and that this can be attained only by continuous association of the officers and men of a unit through training into battle." Many a soldier, victim of expedient inactivations of old and proud units and of the evils of individual rotation, will feel that this particular article of faith has been about as well observed as the Prohibition amendment 30 years ago.

On Air Forces cooperation in close-in support of ground forces during World War II, Dr. Greenfield doesn't mince his words. Of the airmen, he says: "It was impossible to interest them seriously in developing the equipment, techniques or

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We Americans have a tendency to wait until a crisis comes and then go all out in its solution, at the very time when its solution is most costly.


CHESTER BOWLES
Ambassador's Report

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
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skills need for genuine teamwork in ground combat."

He pays tribute to the Army's administrative proficiency, but emphasizes the burdens put on the Army by the many overhead and housekeeping chores it must perform for other elements of the Department of Defense.

This book, by reason of its brevity, lucidity, and variety of subject matter, should not only fulfill Dr. Greenfield's purpose of inviting public attention to the Army's World War II history project, but it will also clarify, for civilian and military readers, some of the Army's current problems.

THE ARMY LINEAGE BOOK
Volume II: Infantry
Chief of Military History
Government Printing Office, 1953
859 Pages; \$2.00

Reviewed by
COLONEL FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER

This volume gathers into compact form the official historical records of all infantry units now on the rolls of the United States Army, and sets out their lineages, battle honors, and distinctive insignia. As to Regular Army and National Guard units, these data have not been published since before World War II, while similar information as to Army Reserve units had never before been compiled in a single publication. The records of the individual units are preceded by an interesting history of the organization of United States Infantry, which traces the effects of tactics and of weapons on the tables of organization.

The several recitals raise some troubling thoughts. Why, for instance, are old regiments with fine traditions so often kept from combat? Of the twenty-five Infantry regiments of the Old Army, i.e., 1869 to 1901, no less than sixteen have no World War I battle honors. Four proud and old National Guard regiments have no World War II battle honors whatever, and two more can show them only for single companies.

And why, when reductions in strength become inevitable, is it apparently always the oldest units that are inactivated? Just before the outbreak of the Korean hostilities, six of the oldest Regular Infantry regiments, including the 1st, 2nd, and 10th, all of which antedated the Civil War, had been so treated. If the destruction of unit morale had been specifically assigned as a mission to G3, it could not have been more successfully accomplished than by such organizational gyrations.

So far as the book under review is concerned, three major criticisms must be made.

First, the cut-off dates are not uniform. Generally the last date is June 1950, but this is not invariably true, and that circumstance not only detracts from the book's usefulness as a reference volume, but will doubtless make more difficult the preparation of supplements.

Second, there is nothing to show the nature of the World War II service ren-

dered by the National Guard regiments separated from their divisions by the 1942 triangularization. Sometimes there is a clue in the battle honors, sometimes not. A few more lines under each unit would have been most helpful in rectifying this substantial omission.

Third, there is no clue to the disposition of the Organized Reserve regiments similarly separated in 1942, and generally converted to other arms. Many of them had World War I battle honors, yet in this volume they have disappeared without trace. The preface says: "The reader who cannot find his own regiment is advised to search carefully through the lineages. By this means he may find its history perpetuated in some other command. Certain Infantry units have been converted to other branches, and consequently will appear in later volumes." But this is surely a most unsatisfactory substitute for a table of disbanded Infantry units showing their disposition.

According to the foreword, *The Army Lineage Book* is being published "initially as a series of provisional volumes, which can be combined into a single, definitive book at a later date." It is to be hoped that the major deficiencies noted above will then be remedied.

Crimea to Korea

A HUNDRED YEARS OF WAR
By Cyril Falls
Gerald Duckworth and Co., London
410 Pages; Map; Index; \$6.00

Reviewed by
H. A. DEWEERD

This is a very useful and interesting survey of a century of warfare by the sometime Chichele professor of history of war at Oxford University. Beginning with the Crimean War 1854-56, Captain Falls shows that the methods of waging war have made continuous progress, but he professes to see little evidence of "revolutions" in war. Change is gradual but continuous, and most any army today could decisively defeat any army of comparable size equipped and trained twenty-five years earlier. Because he feels that tactics are more important in winning wars than strategy, he gives primary attention to fighting. He does not join the chorus of voices berating the conservatism of the military profession but insists that medicine, law and architecture have shown similar resistance to change in the past.

As a feat of condensation, Captain Falls' achievement in covering a century of war in 400 pages is a remarkable one. He does not claim to have included everything of importance that happened but assures his readers that what was left out was at least considered. American readers may be a little surprised to find Lee offered as the "supreme" military figure in this century even though he never commanded more than a hundred thousand men in combat, paid comparatively little attention to tactics, and never had to deal with an ally

or conduct an amphibious operation across great distances.

Captain Falls was among the many British writers who condemned strategic air operations in World War II which had urban areas as their principal targets. But he now admits "that there exists an element of the inevitable in the ascendancy which it won over the minds of leaders who, while half-ashamed of what they were doing, were more than half convinced that no alternative existed."

Due to the concentration of military power in the hands of the Soviet Union and the United States, the author expects to see a war of continents emerge if efforts to preserve peace between the giants fail. He deplores the disappearance of moral factors restraining the actions of nations at war and writes:

"Owing to the recklessness of the modern state, in part inevitably, owing to the arming of whole nations for war and the type of weapons which science has put into their hands, the conduct of war has deteriorated morally. Scruples have been blunted; laws of war and conventions have been disregarded; indiscriminate slaughter has been encouraged; the rights of neutrality have been violated; and the works of art of century upon century have been destroyed without compunction. As a result, war today represents a more deadly menace to mankind and its civilization than it was a century ago. Then, civilization could absorb periodical warfare without suffering serious damage. Whether it can absorb periodical large-scale warfare now must remain a matter of doubt."

But he ends his book with a statement of hope that these terrible disasters may be spared mankind.

This is a handy reference work and will serve admirably as an outline and guide to the history of war since 1850.

War in a Time of Change

THE ART OF WAR IN THE MIDDLE AGES
By C. W. C. Oman. Edited by John H. Beeler
Cornell University Press
176 Pages; Map; \$3.00

Reviewed by
BRIG. GEN. DONALD ARMSTRONG

In his preface, Dr. Beeler points out that Oman's essay on war in the middle ages, published in 1884, is one of the classics of military history. It was "the first attempt to survey the whole broad field of warfare, and it has remained one of the best accounts available to the general reader." Dr. Beeler has revised the text where later studies have showed that changes are needed.

This new edition of a book long out of print is of particular significance today. During those centuries war dominated every other activity. It was a time of trouble, of rapid political, economic and social change. It was a time, like today, when weapons and tactics were in a period of

transition. Since the future military leader should have some knowledge of the effect of conditions like these on the conduct of war, he should welcome this attractive edition of Oman's brief essay. The thoughtful reader will find in this scholarly but entertaining book many lessons applicable to today's manifold problems of war in a swiftly changing environment. It will also provide a fairly adequate substitute for Oman's massive two-volume edition that examines the subject in far greater detail.

The Behavior of "Bolshevik Man"

A STUDY OF BOLSEHEVISM
By Nathan Leites
The Free Press
639 Pages; Index; \$6.50

Reviewed by
STEFAN T. POSSONY

Nathan Leites must be ranked as one of the truly distinguished political scientists of our time. His recent study is a brilliant contribution to the science of political analysis, not only in the information it presents but also in the method it employs.

Through an intensive examination of the complete writings of Lenin and Stalin and through a microscopic study of Soviet reactions to internal and external situations, the author has sought to diagnose the behavior patterns of the "Bolshevik spirit." His model of "Bolshevik man" is without comparison in modern social science literature. The careful reading of *A Study of Bolshevism* by the President, his Cabinet and members of Congress, and by our chief public opinion makers would contribute substantially toward the prevention of a cataclysmic war. Unfortunately, the chances that our political leaders will have time to devote to the study of "Bolshevik man" are small. Let us hope, then, that their working staffs and officers of our armed forces will make every effort to study Leites' unique volume.

To summarize the book's message or challenge the author's judgments—if that were necessary—would require ample space. What is worth repeating in a brief review are those tenets of Bolshevik behavior which concern the very survival of the Western world:

- The Bolshevik "party aims at a radical transformation of the world."

- The Soviets do not entertain any false illusions about the "extreme" risks entailed in such a course.

- The party believes firmly that "all intermediary positions between total victory and total defeat are unstable; that the question of who [will destroy] whom is at all times the only realistic question in the relations between the party and the rest of the world."

- "Spontaneity of the masses" inside and outside the party is similar to the proclivity of even hardened leadership to relax and do what comes "naturally." Such temptation leads to catastrophe, and must be controlled by a "conscious" effort to dominate the "soul."

- "Instead of taking the line of least resistance, one must go to the limit of one's strength and skill."

Failure to understand these crucial points of bolshevik policies will probably represent the last great intellectual failure permitted to this civilization.

What Leites has to say about the possibility of "deals" with the Soviets should be of particular interest to those who are anxious to waste their time in negotiating about the "lessening of international tensions:"

"To Bolsheviks, high tension is the normal state of politics. . . . What Westerners call a 'real agreement' seems to Bolsheviks inconceivable. It is often predicted in the West that if particular issues—the Austrian treaty, for instance—could be settled with the Politburo, an easing of the overall tension might ensue. For Bolsheviks this does not follow. There might be less 'noise,' but the basic situation—the presence of two blocs attempting to annihilate each other—would be unchanged. The only 'real settlement' is that by which one of the contestants is utterly destroyed. . . . A 'general agreement to live and let live'—[achieved by] 'local and limited settlements'—is inconceivable. The party is obliged to strive for the annihilation of its enemies. . . . There are only two stable conditions: being dead and being all powerful."

To the many pessimists who have come to think that the problem of handling the Soviet Union is insoluble, a word of encouragement. Mr. Leites' powerful study, while emphasizing Soviet strengths, is also a primer of Soviet weaknesses. Dostoyevsky's words of many years ago still apply:

"It would be to our great disadvantage if our neighbors were to perceive us more minutely and from a shorter distance. In the fact that, so far, they have understood nothing about us, lay our great strength. But the point is, that at present, it seems, alas, that they are beginning to comprehend us better than heretofore: *this is very dangerous.*"

Revolution and Intervention

THE ALLIES AND THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
By Robert D. Warth
Duke University Press
294 Pages; Index; \$4.50
THE SIBERIAN FIASCO
By Clarence A. Manning
Library Publishers
210 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$3.75

Reviewed by
COLONEL R. ERNEST DUPUY

Mr. Warth's well-written, well-documented thesis covers the initial year of the upheaval rocking the world in 1917—the great revolution which demolished despotic Tsarism only to replace it with bloodier, anti-Christian Communism. Unfortunately, however, in this reviewer's opinion it adds nothing new to the sordid tale.

Perhaps the best thing about it is that here between the covers of one book are

most of the facts already published elsewhere, in one way or another. Also, lest we forget, it reiterates the unpleasant truth that the diplomats of both the United States and the Allies are to blame for an almost complete misunderstanding of what was going on in Russia.

The childish ignorance of realities evidenced by our own Ambassador to Russia, David R. Francis, was equalled only by the blundering concepts of Raymond Robins, American Red Cross representative. The one swallowed whole the wishful thinking of Tsarist proponents, the other the sugar-coated pills rolled by Lenin, Trotsky, *et al.* Between them they so clouded Woodrow Wilson's idealistic vision as to produce the later fantastic military expeditions to North Russia and Siberia.

It was unfortunate indeed that the United States, with no axe to grind in the European area except to finish the war with Germany, should have been led down the garden path by the Allies through the stupidity of our own diplomats. There was, of course, no justification militarily or otherwise for participation in the North Russia fiasco. The Siberian expedition did have some logical reasoning behind it, since it countered Japan's bid for the Maritime Provinces of Siberia.

The book ends with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, curtain of the first act in the bloody drama of the U.S.S.R., and prelude to these military ventures. The reader puts it down with the inevitable reaction: "This is where we came in."

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As to Mr. Manning's book, it must be said that it is in no way an exhaustive account of the operations of General Graves' expedition in 1918-20. However it does attempt to analyze objectively the causes and the results of what the author so well characterizes as a "fiasco." If not so comprehensive as John Albert White's *The Siberian Intervention*, it is one more searchlight thrown upon a diplomatic blunder which constitutes prelude to World War II and to Soviet empire-building in Asia.

General Graves, operating under President Wilson's famous *aide-memoire*, found himself plunged into a mess in which our own State Department, acting apparently at cross-purposes to Wilson's directive, was his worst hindrance.

Ghosts of two men long dead stalk through these pages; the unfortunate Kolchak and the unspeakable Semenov—the

latter furnished a bit too bright, in this reviewer's opinion. They share space with our then Ambassador to Japan, Roland Morris, and the Consul General at Irkutsk, Ernest L. Harris. These two, with free-wheeling Raymond Robins, combined in effort to hamstring Graves.

This book's only interest to the soldier is as illustration of the amazing cross-play between State and War Departments, hampering a commander in the field; Graves' own book, *America's Siberian Adventure*, tells the military side.

Dr. Manning's contention that this episode furnishes a key to the riddle of Soviet empire-building, and also to its possible future dissolution, gives food for thought. It is unfortunate that sloppy copy-reading mars the reader's enjoyment. His publishers should have served him and the reader better.

Breaches in the Chinese Wall

MODERN CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY
By Werner Levi
University of Minnesota Press
399 Pages; Index; \$5.50

Reviewed by
STEFAN T. POSSONY

Professor Levi has compiled an interesting, objective and on the whole quite accurate history of China's foreign policy since 1840. Based largely on non-Chinese language and secondary source materials, his analysis of the factors which have given birth to Chinese policy, though not complete, is lucid, and in proper perspective. Starting with the feudal and Confucian thought patterns of a nation supreme in its isolationism and supra-individualism, the author traces China's tortured experiences from the opening of her ports to

A Selected Check List of the Month's Books

This run-down of some of the books received for review during the month preceding our deadline is to give our readers who like to follow current literature a current check list of the most important, useful and potentially popular books. Full reviews of some of these books will appear in this or subsequent issues. Any of these titles may be purchased through the Combat Forces Book Service. See page 56 for order coupon and a complete listing of Selected Books for Military Readers.

THE HISTORIAN AND THE ARMY. By Kent Roberts Greenfield. 99 Pages; \$2.50. How the history of the U.S. Army in World War II is being written, by the Army's Chief Historian.

KESSELING: A SOLDIER'S STORY. By Marshal Albert Kesselring. William Morrow & Company, 1954. 381 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5. Memoirs of the German C-in-C in Italy and the western front.

SOLDIERS AND SOLDIERING. By Field Marshal Earl Wavell. British Book Centre, 1954. 174 Pages; \$2. Talks on leadership.

THE WAR IN KOREA. By Major R. C. W. Thomas. Gale & Polden, 1954. 119 Pages; Illustrated; Maps; \$2.00. A military study of the war in Korea up to the cease fire.

THE EXECUTION OF PRIVATE SLOVIK. By William Bradford Huie. The New American Library, 1954. 192 Pages; \$3.25. A highly flavored report on the service, trial and execution of the only soldier to be executed for deserting in the face of the enemy during World War II.

AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. By A. R. M. Murray. Philosophical Library, 1954. 240 Pages; Index; \$4.75. The author is Extension Lecturer in Social Philosophy in the University of London.

WHY DICTATORS? By George W. F. Hallgarten. The Macmillan Company, 1954. 379 Pages; Index; \$5.50. The causes and forms of dictatorships which have appeared from 600 B.C. to the present day.

CHURCHILL BY HIS CONTEMPORARIES. Edited by Charles Eade. Simon & Schuster, 1954. 461 Pages; Index; Illustrated; \$6. Thirty-nine analyses by persons of prominence, including Compton Mackenzie, Emanuel Shinwell, Air Marshal Joubert, President Eisenhower, Adolf Hitler, Mrs. Roosevelt, General Martel, Paul Rey-

naud, Leslie Hore-Belisha, A. P. Herbert, A. M. Low, and Bernard Shaw.

THE CHALLENGE OF MAN'S FUTURE. By Harrison Brown. The Viking Press, 1954. 290 Pages; Index; \$3.75. A scientist calls for mankind to enlist in a crusade that will save civilization.

POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD. Edited by Walter H. Mallory. Council on Foreign Relations, 1954. 231 Pages; \$3.75. Composition of governments, political party programs and leaders, affiliations and editors of leading periodicals, and other political information.

CAVALRY OF THE SKY. By Lynn Montross. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 92 Pages; \$3. The story of Marine Corps helicopter operations since World War II.

THE INDIAN WARS OF THE WEST. By Paul I. Wellman. Doubleday & Company, 1954. 484 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5. A Hollywood writer tells the story of the Army's part in the settling of the West.

AIRCRAFT CARRIER. By J. Bryan, III. Ballantine Books, 1954. 205 Pages; Cloth, \$3, paper \$3.50. What it was really like on CV *Yorktown* in the Pacific. By the co-author of *Admiral Halsey's Story* and *Mission Beyond Darkness*.

COMMODORE JOHN PAUL JONES, U. S. NAVY. By Capt. Donald John Munro, R.N. William-Frederick Press, 1954. 109 Pages; \$3. An unbiased and eulogistic account.

A HISTORY OF THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY. By Clement Eaton. The Macmillan Company, 1954. 351 Pages; Index; \$5.50. An outstanding work on Confederate politics and government.

CHANGING GREENLAND. By Geoffrey Williamson. Library Publishers, 1954. 280 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$3.95. A timely book on the great island, with a fine section on Thule.

THIS IS INDIA. By Santha Rama Rau. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 155 Pages; Illustrated; \$2.50. A lively personal report by the author of *Home to India* and *East of Home*.

HOW TO MAKE SENSE. By Rudolf Fleisch. Harper & Brothers, 1954. 202 Pages; \$2.75. The latest in this author's series in self-expression.

HOW TO OPERATE EXCAVATION EQUIPMENT. By Herbert L. Nichols, Jr. North Castle Books, 1954. 150 Pages; Illustrated; \$1.50. Adopted as a text by Corps of Engineers schools and other facilities.

MONEY CONVERTER AND TIPPING GUIDE FOR EUROPEAN TRAVEL. By Charles Vomacka. Dover Publications, 1954. \$5.50. Converts foreign currency into dollars, dollars into foreign currency. Also tipping information; government regulations; official, unofficial and black market rates; pictures of coins.

HOW TO TAKE BETTER PHOTOGRAPHS. Edited by Betty M. Kanameishi. Popular Mechanics Press, 1954. 160 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$2.50. All the professional tricks of composition, lighting, developing and enlarging.

THE EXPLOITS OF SHERLOCK HOLMES. By Adrian Conan Doyle and John Dickson Carr. Random House, 1954. 338 Pages; \$3.95. A new collection, never before published in book form, based on unsolved cases from the original stories.

THE GLORIOUS MORNINGS. By Paul Hyde Bonner. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954. 228 Pages; \$3.75. Stories of shooting and fishing, ranging from rural New York State, South Carolina, Maryland, Pennsylvania, on to Scotland, Ireland, and Italy.

THE SATURDAY EVENING POST STORIES. 1953. 344 Pages; \$3. The annual collection of popular fiction from the SEP.

Western trade to the emergence of the present Communist state. The gradual development of foreign policy through rebellion, foreign exploitation, cultural upheaval, dynastic changes and war is explained with skill and learning.

Levi is to be commended on several grounds: The bad faith of the West, including the United States, toward China in many dealings from Versailles through Yalta is exposed candidly. Similarly, Tsarist and Soviet imperialism *vis-à-vis* China is laid bare with no mincing of words. The author shows that Chinese Communist policy was subordinated to Moscow's direction from its earliest days, and especially between 1941 and 1949. Thus, the myth of Mao's independent rise to power is destroyed by a scholar who surely had no preconceived notions on this score. Lastly, present Sino-Soviet relations and Chinese Communist aspirations in Asia are analyzed in their intimate relation to the Soviet-directed efforts at world domination.

The author, however, can be criticized for failing to consider the conspiratorial influence of American Communism on developments in China, especially after 1943; paying lip service to the questionable contention that the Chinese Nationalist regime must bear practically all of the responsibility for its own demise; taking an entirely negative attitude toward the incredible difficulties encountered by Chiang Kai-shek in his 30-year struggle to create a modern China; failing to attribute Chiang's 1926 break from the Communists to his early and full appreciation of their real aims.


It is regretted that, in the interest of avoiding the non-objective "virtuosity that marks . . . contemporary political . . . portrait painting," Professor Levi has restricted his analysis of the American and international Communist impact on the affairs of modern China to a small footnote:

"The 'arguments' of the Great Debate on American China policy are not considered here in detail. The debate had little to do with the facts. It belongs, not to Chinese history, but rather to the sad history of American party politics."

This specious attitude to a historical debate on the unsupported assumption that it had "little to do with the facts," is quite inexcusable and surely is not based on objective fact-finding. The author's failure to use the factual information produced in the Congressional hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations and the MacArthur dismissal amounts to deliberate neglect of first-class source materials. While Levi is clearheaded on many counts, he just has not yet come to understand the full implications of the Communist techniques of conflict management.

Nevertheless, *Modern China's Foreign Policy* is a good-sized step forward in a field where American educators and "old China hands" have been traditionally slow in recognizing the facts of life.

MAY 1954



Pass In Review

The growing popularity in hobby work, particularly among service people, is an interesting phenomenon. Psychologically, we're told, it's a healthy trend. As our contribution to the cause, we'd like to mention a new handbook in the hobby field that probably won't come to the attention of the people who would be interested in it. This one is called *Plexiglas: Craftsman's Handbook* (\$1.50). This attractively printed handbook describes all of the various processes involved in fabricating items from Plexiglas. There are lots of pictures, too, to illustrate the various steps involved.

This has been a busy month for historians of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt era. Leading off, we find a book by Rear Admiral USN (Rtd) Robert A. Theobald called *The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor* (\$3.50) which purports to show that FDR was responsible for the debacle suffered by our Navy on that day that "will live in infamy." Admiral Theobald can scarcely be termed a disinterested party since he acted as an advisor to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, the naval commander in Hawaii, at the time of the Japanese attack. Offsetting this attack on FDR is one directed at the staunch Republican, Henry Stimson, who is also given the blame for Pearl Harbor in Richard Current's *Secretary Stimson* (\$4.50). So you can take your pick—personally, we blame the Japanese war lords and Hitler. Getting back to the Roosevelt part of the era, we do want to mention a new biography (and the only one we've seen) on Louis McHenry Howe written by one of his secretaries, Lela Stiles. The book is called *The Man Behind Roosevelt* (\$4.75) and sympathetically relates the story of the ex-newspaperman who guided the Roosevelt political destinies from their beginnings. Though his passion for anonymity made it difficult to assess his full worth at the time, his prescience as to the ultimate stature of FDR and his loyalty and devotion to the cause were beyond question. Even if you don't particularly admire FDR, this book will be of interest.

Speaking of FDR reminds us of the White House and the White House reminds us of a new book we just received with the unlikely title of (you guessed it) *The White House* (\$3.95). Basically, this is a beautifully illustrated (many of the pictures are in color) tour of the Executive Mansion. However, the bright text adds a great deal to the worth of the book. In it the authors trace the residents of the White House and the changes which each of them made in the place. One interesting series of photographs shows the various sets of china which have been purchased over the years for use on state occasions.

Many of you will be delighted to know that Rudolf Flesch has written a new self-help book called *How to Make Sense* (\$2.75). This book sort of ties together his previous *The Art of Plain Talk* (\$2.50), *The Art of Readable Writing* (\$3.00) and *The Art of Clear Thinking* (\$2.75) by showing how improving your speaking, reading and writing can help you to a better way of life. Doctor Flesch is his usual frank and uninhibited self and, as might be expected, has little patience with the Great Books, vocabulary building books or those on English improvement, which he dismisses as "communication pills." It is sometimes difficult to go all the way with the theses advanced by Doctor Flesch, but there is much in his writing that is excellent, and you are always stimulated by reading him. This latest effort is no exception.

Since we've already let ourselves get slightly involved in politics this month, we might as well go all the way and tell you about a fine new book that has just been written by William S. White, chief Congressional correspondent for *The New York Times*. This book, *The Taft Story* (\$3.50), is an honest and objective study of one of the more controversial and influential political figures of the last decade. While this is by no means a definitive biography (and White never claims it is), it is an excellent piece of writing and will probably stand for a good long while as the best on Taft, for it is going to be difficult to do a much better biography of him until more time has passed and his impact on America can be better judged.

—R.F.C.

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